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ABSTRACT

The Native American framework for environmental protection places a
sanctity on nature, which cannot be fully realized under either existing
environmental protection laws or through the tribal trust obligations. In the
face of these legal deficiencies, tribes and their members can consider
resorting to other legal protections to assert tribal environmental
sovereignty, including tribal treaty provisions and international human
rights law. This Article assesses tribal sovereignty through the lens of
energy infrastructure projects on Indian lands, and concludes that updates
to the federal right-of-way law chisel away at tribal rights to land,
property, and self-determination. A rights-based approach to tribal trust
obligations offers heightened protections for these whittled-away rights.
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INTRODUCTION

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and participation
rights should mean more, not less, on tribal lands when respect for tribal
sovereignty and federal tribal trust responsibilities exists. This Article
proposes a rights-based approach to reinvigorate tribal treaty regimes based
on a historico-legal analysis of the interconnected right-of-way doctrine and
environmental impact statement process for pipeline projects in "Indian
Country." This legal strategy will enrich the democratic approaches to tribal
consultation, and respond to environmental justice concerns arising from
lax regulations and the subsequent environmental degradation. The aim of
this Article is to reframe the responses to tribal environmental challenges
on account of deficiencies in NEPA and prior tribal trust claims. It also
offers recommendations to overcome those challenges through analyzing
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the history of right-of-way regulations in Indian Country, the standards for
impact statements, and treaty language. Moreover, this Article assesses
tribal sovereignty through the lens of energy infrastructure projects on
Indian lands, and concludes that updates to the federal right-of-way law
chisel away at tribal rights to land, property, and self-determination. 1
Without a thorough reassessment of the essential rights-of-way laws that
affect pipeline permitting on tribal lands, tribal environmental sovereignty
will be compromised, and tribal land will be more prone to environmental
degradation and pollution from increased toxins and hazards associated
with oil and gas transport. This Article argues that using existing NEPA
procedural remedies, 2 in concert with provisions from the updated rights-ofway regulations in Indian Country, provides project development and
litigation outcomes more attenuated to Indian interests. 3
American Indian tribes face exceptional land use, property, and
environmental challenges because of hydrocarbon transport projects on
their lands. 4 Due to the tribes' various geographic locations throughout the
United States, and their proximity to existing and future hydrocarbon
reserves, pipelines crisscross tribal lands with increased frequency and

1. Rights-of-Way on Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 79,258 (Dec. 21, 2015) (to be codified at 25
C.F.R. pt. 169) (promulgating a rule "streamlin[ing] the process for obtaining Bmeau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) grants of rights-of-way on Indian land and BIA land, while supporting tribal self-determination
and self-governance"). See also 25 C.F.R. pt. 169 (2016) (prescribing the procedmes, terms, and
conditions under which rights-of-way over tribal lands may be granted).
2. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4370 (2012). The Revised
Draft Guidance for Greenhouse Emissions and Climate Change Impacts of the White House Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) provides additional support for environmental protection. The legacy of
previous attempts at climate change adaptation measmes is diminishing with a new White House
administration. Yet, existing federal regulations and environmental protection measmes-along with
private-public partnerships-will minimize the assault on environmental rights by federal leadership
that is attuned to the interests of the fossil fuel industry. See WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, REVISED DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR GREENHOUSE EMISSIONS AND CLIMATE
CHANGE
IMPACTS
1-2
(Dec.
18,
2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/nepa_revised_draft_ghg_guidance.pdf.
3. Rights-of-Way on Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,492, 72,492 (Nov. 19, 2015) (to be
codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 169) (promulgating a rule "[s]treamlining the process for obtaining a right-ofway on Indian land"). The total climate change litigation in the United States exceeds that of the rest of
the world combined. By 2013, more than 420 climate cases had been resolved in the United States
versus 173 for the rest of the world. Michael B. Gerrard, Scale and Focus of Climate Litigation Outside
the U.S., N.Y. LAW JOURNAL (Mar. 12, 2015), http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/
files/microsites/climate-change/nyljscaleandfocusofclimatelitigationoutsideofunitedstates_ O.pdf.
4. See Bill McKibben, Why Dakota Is the New Keystone, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/29/opinion/why-dakota-is-the-new-keystone.html (discussing Native
Americans conducting peaceful protests against an oil pipeline seeking to address clean water,
environmental justice, and climate issues).
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canying capacity. 5 A hydrocarbon transport project in a right-of-way
corridor creates an economically efficient means of passage for energy
resources, but such a project also sullies tribal property, sovereignty, and
environmental rights. From a legal perspective, a pipeline poses significant
risks to the use and enjoyment of tribal land, and uniquely threatens sacred
space. 6
While concern for pipeline siting is ubiquitous, what is less
conspicuous-but equally significant-is the property and environmental
rights impact of energy projects on tribal lands and on former tribal lands
ceded to the United States. 7 More than 50 million acres of Indian trust lands
exist in the United States. 8 Thousands of miles of easements traverse tribal
lands for various purposes as crucial fragments of the national
infrastructure. 9 Significant swaths of tribal lands lay within the path of
major energy infrastructure projects. 10 American Indian communities
experience an imbalanced proportion of environmental degradation on
account of the mineral development in North America. 11
Without improved tribal consultations and more robust treaty claims,
the updated rights-of-way regulations in Indian Country will lead to a
steady and blatant encroachment of tribal lands. Moreover, this will also
affect all future development of energy easements, including lands of the
White Earth Band of Ojibwe in northwestern Minnesota, Navajo Nation in
Texas and New Mexico, and the Seminole Tribe of Florida's Big Cypress
Reservation. 12 Under these regulations, native environmental protection

5. See Jack Healy, North Dakota Oil Pipeline Battle: Whose Fighting and Why?, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 2, 2016), https ://www.nytimes.com/2016/11102/us/north-dakota-oil-pipeline-battle-whos-fightingand-why.html (stating that there are 2.5 million miles of pipelines crossing the United States).
6. See id. (discussing the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe's opposition to the Dakota access
pipeline for crossing over sacred tribal land).
7. Andrew S. Montgomery, Tribal Sovereignty and Congressional Dominion: Rights-of-Way
for Gas Pipelines on Indian Reservations, 38 STAN. L. REV. 195, 199 (1985).
8. C.E. Willoughby, Native American Sovereignty Takes a Back Seat to the "Pig in the
Parlor:" The Redefining of Tribal Sovereignty in Traditional Property Law Terms, 19 S. ILL. L.J. 593,
601 (1995).
9. Todd Miller, Comment, Easements on Tribal Sovereignty, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 105, 105
(2001). Rights-of-way easements encompass "highways, railroads, electric transmission lines, oil and
gas pipelines, and various communication facilities." Id.
10. See Daniel W. Hester, Protection of Sacred Sites and Cultural Resources: An Obstacle
to Development in Indian Country?, 23A ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 11 (1989) (noting that
development of the Powder River region would impact the Norther Cheyenne Tribe).
11. James M. Grijalva, Control and Accountability: The Twin Dimensions of Tribal
Sovereignty Necessary to Achieve Environmental Justice for Native America, in TRIBES, LAND, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 30 (Sarah Krakoff & Ezra Rosser eds., 2012).
12. See Miller, supra note 9, at 130 (identifying the need for more energy easements across
tribal land to satisfy the demand for more transmission capacity).
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concerns are devalued and underappreciated, particularly in negotiating
and/or contesting pipeline siting and permitting. 13 Based on the unique
nature of the pipeline industry and asset specificity, long distance pipelines
create distinct financing and contracting matters. 14 "[A] century of dealing
with oil and gas pipelines shows just how hard it is to keep them from being
used as John D. Rockefeller first discovered they could be-as levers to
frustrate competition in commodity markets and as profitable tollgates lying
athwart commodity trade routes. " 15 The economics of the pipeline industry
also make the business climate adverse to environmental and tribal land
concerns.
Part I provides the jurisdictional overlay of rights and duties involved
with projects on tribal lands. Part II examines the legal nuances in the
development of right-of-way regulations in what constitutes Indian lands.
Parts 11.C and 11.D posit that NEPA sufficiently allows for stronger claims
against pipeline projects. Analyzing tribal challenges to pipelines in the
cases of Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. U.S. Department of State and
TransCanada Pipeline 16 and White Earth Nation v. U.S. Department of
State 17 showcases distinct methodological opportunities to take advantage
of legal remedies implicit in NEPA. 18 To counter threats to tribal
environmental sovereignty by an ever-expanding consortium of oil and gas
operations, Part III offers an ancillary proposal of normative guidelines.
These guidelines heighten transparency, incorporate a richer understanding
of the NEPA process in energy permitting, and enhance measures for a
better participatory process to avoid legal showdowns, such as the Dakota
Access Pipeline Project.
13. See Rights-of-Way on Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,492, 72,492 (Nov. 19, 2015) (to be
codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 169) (noting the absence of environmental considerations, despite the
streamlined process). See also 25 C.F.R. § 169.3 (2016) (giving the Secretary authority to grant right-ofway permits).
14. JEFF D. MAKHOLM, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PIPELINES: A CENTURY OF
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 175 (2012).
15. Jd.at176.
16. Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. U.S. Dep't of State, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079 (D.S.D.
2009).
17. White Earth Nation v. Kerry, No. 14-4726 (MJD/LIB), 2015 WL 8483278, at *1 (D. Minn.
Dec. 9, 2015).
18. The rights-of-way revisions include: (1) "Eliminating the need to obtain BIA consent for
surveying in preparation for applying for a right-of-way"; (2) "Establishing timelines for BIA review of
rights-of-way requests"; "Clarifying processes for BIA review of right-of-way documents"; (4)
"[A]llowing BIA disapproval only where there is a stated compelling reason"; (5) "[P]roviding greater
deference to Tribes on decisions affecting lands"; (6) Clarifying the authority by which BIA approves
rights-of-way; and (7) "[E]liminating outdated requirements that apply to specific different types of
rights-of-way." Rights-of-Way on Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,492, 72,492 (Nov. 19, 2015) (to be
codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 169).
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I. THE JURISDICTIONAL LANDSCAPE

Tribal members suffer from natural resource exploitation in a more
adverse manner than non-Indians because of the indigenous connection to
native lands. Tribal leaders share a central concern that developers will
desire isolated Indian lands for energy projects. 19 The importance of
indigenous land, title, and property exploitation weigh into the
determination of what constitutes an indigenous group. 20 Indigenous
property provides "the source of indigenous worship and the object of
indigenous return." 21 Both the public and private spheres use indigenous
land and resources. In the public sphere, the state takes advantage of its
authority over native peoples. 22 Even though individual acts of Congress
require coordination with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land
Management, Bureau of Reclamation, National Park Service, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, and U.S. Forest Service, these agencies often neglect or
fail to fully account for indigenous land concerns by favoring the
commercial economic interests of project developers. 23 Since indigenous
peoples are underrepresented in government, they have limited leverage
with governing authorities. 24 On account of these inequities, indigenous
peoples continue to suffer environmental harm disproportionately on a
global scale. 25 In the United States, which values human rights, property
rights, and environmental stewardship, tribes do not achieve adequate
19. See WARNER K. REESER, COUNCIL OF ENERGY RESOURCE TRIBES, INVENTORY OF
HAzARDOUS WASTE GENERATORS AND SITES ON SELECTED INDIAN RESERVATIONS, 2, 24 (1985)
(illustrating that tribal lands' vast open spaces and proximity to industrial developments make tribal
lands common sites for hazardous waste disposal). See generally Pamela D'Angelo, Waste Management
Industry Turns to Indian Reservations as States Close Landfills, 21 ENV'T REP. 1607, 1607 (1990)
(discussing how waste management companies are seeking to develop landfills on Indian lands).
20. David Fagan, Multinational Corporations, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, THE ENVIRONMENT,
AND LAW 139, 141 (Lawrence Watters ed., 2004).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 142. See generally Sumudu Atapattu, The Significance of International

Environmental Law Principles in Reinforcing or Dismantling the North-South Divide, in
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 97, 100--07 (Shawkat Alam et al.
eds., 2015) (providing examples of sovereign states using their superior position and information to
skew negotiations with indigenous peoples and violate basic human rights); Louis J. Kotze, Human
Rights, the Environment and the Global South, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE
GLOBAL SOUTH 184, 185-87 (providing further examples of coercive state negotiations).
23. See generally Robert McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal Trust
Obligation to American Indians, 19 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1, 87-91, 99-101 (2004) (discussing the role of
and criticism against the Bmeau of Indian Affairs in managing the rights of Indian tribes. The Article
also discusses the BIA's actions pmsuant to federal statutes and in coordination with the other offices in
the Department of Interior).
24. Fagan, supra note 20, at 142.
25. Id.
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representation to protect their interests in energy development projects from
multinational enterprises. 26
While Native Nations managed and consumed natural resources,
consumption rates increased when Europeans settled the New World. 27
Later under U.S. dominion and rule, Native Nations not only lost property
rights, but also they lost the ability to use the land. 28 Congress intended
federal Indian laws to disengage and mollify Native Nations. 29 First,
because of overlapping layers of administrative regulation, the legal scheme
for securing rights-of-way on Indian lands benefits the economic interests
of the oil and gas industry and pipeline operators to the detriment of Native
Nations. 30 The Secretary of the Department of the Interior (DOI) has the
power to grant rights-of-way across Indian lands. 31 The stated mission of
the DOI is to protect the country's "natural resources and cultural heritage"
and honor tribal communities. 32 The DOI's overarching mission and goals
with competing land and cultural claims intrinsically clash and favor nonIndians to the detriment of Indians. 33 A secondary issue is the prodigious
26. See, e.g., AL GEDICKS, NATIVE AND ENVIRONMENTAL STRUGGLES AGAINST
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 42-43 (1993) (explaining that tribal lease negotiations are "among the
poorest agreements ever made"); Mark Anthony Rolo, The Indian Wars Have Never Ended,
PROGRESSIVE.ORG (Jan. 26, 2017), http://progressive.org/magazine/the-indian-wars-have-never-ended/
(discussing how the federal government often turns a blind eye to mining and pipeline threats from
multinational corporations).
27. Jason J. Czarnezki, Everyday Environmentalism: Concerning Consumption, 41 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10374, 10375 (2011).
28. Id.
29. 25 U.S.C. § 324 (2012). Native Nations include American Indian tribal governments as
well as Native Alaskan and Native Hawaiian groups. See, e.g., Notice, Indian Entities Recognized and
Eligible To Receive Services From the United States Bmeau of Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 5019, 5020
(Jan. 29, 2016) (describing the purpose of visiting Alaska natives separately, which was to reference
them independently); Frances Kai-haw Wang, Dept. of Interior Finalizes Rule to Recognize Native
Hawaiian Government, NBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2016, 6:24 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asianamerica/ department-interior-finalizes-rule-recognize-nati ve-hawaiian-government-n65 3631 (discussing
the new federal administrative procedmes regarding native Hawaiian tribal governments).
30. See 25 U.S.C. § 324 (noting the ability of the Secretary to overrule Indian consent).
31. 25 U.S.C. § 323 (2012).
32. Mission Statement, U.S. DEP'T INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/whoweare/MissionStatement (last visited May 8, 2017).
33. See, e.g., Uma Outka, Environmental Justice Issues in Sustainable Development:
Environmental Justice in the Renewable Energy Transition, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 60,
100-01 (2012) (discussing the impact of the Energy Policy Act of2005 on tribal communities); Paul E.
Frye, Section 1813 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005: Implications for Tribal Sovereignty and SelfSufficiency, 42 TuLSA L. REV. 75, 87 (2006) (describing the tribal opposition to§ 1813 of the Energy
Policy Act of2005); Judith V. Royster, Tribal Energy Development: Renewables and the Problem of the
Current Statutory Structures, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 91, 136 (2012) (explaining how regulation of
renewable energy is prohibitively cumbersome for tribes, and new legislation is needed); Christy
McCann, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: FERC 's Tribal Consultation Requirement and the
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task that plaintiffs from Native Nations face when they contest energy
permits and siting processes. They must overcome systemic legal barriers
for achieving environmental justice and actualizing land protection. 34
Because of problems with legal status and standing, such plaintiffs lack
effective legal regimes to contest pipelines in their territories and on sacred
native lands. 35 Subsections I.A and I.B explain how the jurisdictional
overlay complicates property rights and environmental claims brought
forward by plaintiffs from Native Nations. 36 The multitude of variables for
litigation actions such as venue, time, financial resources, redressability,
justiciability, and procedural standing are exacerbated for claims involving
Indian lands. 37 Tribal property and environmental claims have a more
burdensome threshold to meet procedurally and substantively because of
the unique milieu of federal, state, and tribal laws. 38 This establishment of
complex laws does not make claims prohibitive, but the bureaucratic steps

Hydropower Re-Licensing at Post Falls Dam, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 411, 439-42 (2006) (discussing the
evolving definition of "consultation" in case law); Charles R. Zeh & Treva J. Hearne, Development
Considerations on Indian Lands, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 350, 372 (1998) (discussing the
interaction between corporations, non-tribal interests, and tribal interests on tribal lands); Ryan David
Dreveskracht, Native Nation Economic Development via the Implementation of Solar Projects: How to
Make it Work, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 27, 49-109 (2011) (promoting implementation of solar energy
projects in tribal lands as a means for sustainable economic development in Indian Country; such
projects do not only provide general economic benefits, but also advance practical sovereignty, the
formation of capable institutions, and an economic opportunity that matches the tribes' cultures); Kurt
Gasser, The TransCanada Keystone XL Pipeline: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly Debate, 32 UTAH
ENVTL. L. REV. 489, 494, 503--04, 508--09, 511 (2012) (illustrating President Obama and the
Department of State's priority on achieving economic and national secmity through oil pipelines at the
expense of environmental secmity).
34. See James M. Grijalva & Daniel E. Goga!, The Evolving Path Toward Achieving
Environmental Justice for Native America, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10905, 10905 (2010)
(noting that indigenous peoples lack many resomces to oppose energy development projects).
35. Jana L. Walker et al., A Closer Look at Environmental Injustice in Indian Country, 1
SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 379, 382-83 (2002) (explaining the unique legal status of Native Americans as
sovereign nations, but still subject to the plenary power of the federal government). See also SissetonWahpeton Oyate v. U.S. Dep't of State, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078 (D.S.D. 2009) (finding that the
tribe lacked standing because it was unable to prove the redressability prong); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v.
Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 167 (1977) (holding that tribes do not have absolute and exclusive rights
to important natural resomces passing through reservations); Arrow Midstream Holdings, LLC v. 3
Bears Constr., LLC, 873 N.W.2d 16, 23 (N.D. 2015) (noting that unless the Tribes appear, a private
party has no standing).
36. See infra Parts LA, LB (discussing the status of tribal land under U.S. law and international
law).
37. Geneva E.B. Thompson, The Double-Edged Sword of Sovereignty by the Barrel: How
Native Nations Can Wield Environmental Justice in the Fight Against the Harms of Fracking, 63 UCLA
L. REV. 1818, 1860 (2016).
38. Walker et al., supra note 35, at 382-83 (discussing the complex relationship between
federal, state, and tribal laws as they apply to Native Americans).
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to the courthouse do make these claims on tribal lands more cumbersome to
successfully litigate.
Courts grapple with defining "Indian Country." The term Indian
Country is subject to an imprecise statutory definition. 39 The legal
definition, nonetheless, raises problems, as evidenced by ongoing disputes
over property rights, natural resource extraction, and indigenous land use.
Thomas Berry argues that contemporary societies should consider
indigenous practices as: "[D]ialogue with native peoples ... throughout the
world is urgently needed to provide the human community with models of a
more integral human presence to the Earth."40 The indigenous notions of
land have the simultaneous existence of obligations and rights that are
place-specific to the land. 41 Irene Watson argues, "Ownership is not
exclusive. And it does not define the owned object as a commodity: instead
it defines it as the concern of a limited group of people who stand in a
particular relationship. "42 Indigenous conceptualizations of land are more
akin to the Anglo-American governance model with property as a bundle of
sticks. Watson rejects the formal native title system, arguing that it erodes
and subverts native identities. 43 As such, she contends that "[n]ative title
does nothing to help us care for country," and she observes the law of
people outside formal legal mechanisms. 44 This framework clarifies the
consequence of vernacular law. 45 The official legal recognition of "both
ecocentric and indigenous descriptions of private property are related and
there is the potential for great benefit from a dialogue and shared learning
from both perspectives."46 When the Anglo-American and Indian notions of
property clash, the Eurocentric configuration of property supersedes.

39. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012).
40. THOMAS BERRY, THE GREAT WORK: OUR WAY INTO THE FUTURE 180 (1999).
41. PETER D. BURDON, EARTH JURISPRUDENCE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
121 (2015).
42. Id. (quoting Irene Watson, Buried Alive, 13 L. & CRITIQUE 253, 46-47 (2002)).
43. Irene Watson, Buried Alive, 13 L. & CRITIQUE 253, 264 (2002). Watson is an elder among
the Tanganekald-Meintangk peoples, who are the custodians of an area in Southeastern Australia,
known as the Coorong.
44. Id. at 260.
45. BURNS H. WESTON & DAVID BOLLIER, GREEN GOVERNANCE: ECOLOGICAL SURVIVAL,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE LAW OF THE COMMONS 104 (2013).
46. BURDON, supra note 41, at 122.
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A. Status of Indian Nations Under U.S. Law

Federally-recognized tribes are "recognized by treaty, statute,
administrative process, or other intercourse with the United States. "47
"[D]espite some historical and ethnographic evidence concerning [their]
existence," non-federally-recognized tribes do not have the same rights
afforded to the federally recognized counterparts. 48 The term recognized is
"a legal term of art"49 and signifies "a formal political act" and
"permanently establishes a government-to-government relationship
between the United States and the recognized tribe as a 'domestic
dependent nation,' and [it] imposes on the government a fiduciary trust
relationship to the tribe and its members." 50 What constitutes a federally
recognized tribe impacts the rights of the indigenous body in seeking
redress under tribal treaty and congressional trust obligations. This
classification system disadvantages indigenous native groups who are not
federally recognized. Those tribes that are federally recognized can
establish and maintain their own form of government, 51 unless Congress has
passed a statute delineating the method of choosing tribal representatives or
other aspects of the tribal governance system. 52
Control and ownership on Indian lands depend on an intricate land use
system. Judith Royster distinguishes four different types of land ownership
within tribal territories: "[T]ribal trust land, Indian allotments, Indian fee
land, and non-Indian fee land."53 The land ceded by the tribes through

47. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.02(3) (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
2012) [hereinafter COHEN'S].
48. Id.
49. H.R. REP. No. 103-781, at 2, (1994). See also COHEN'S, supra note 47, § 3.02(3)
(describing federal tribe recognition).
50. COHEN'S, supra note 47, § 3.02(3)(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 103-781, at 3 (1994)).
51. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62-63 (1978). See, e.g., COHEN'S, supra note
47, § 3.02(3).
52. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137, 139 ("[I]fthe principal chiefofthe
Choctaw, Cherokee, Creek, or Seminole tribe ... shall refuse or neglect to perform the duties devolving
upon him, he may be removed from office by the President of the United States ... who may fill any
vacancy arising from removal, disability or death of the incumbent, by appointment of a citizen by blood
of the tribe."); COHEN'S, supra note 47, § 4.02(3)(a) (declaring that in the modem era, Congress has the
power to "clearly and unambiguously" limit tribal sovereignty over jmisdiction).
53. Judith V. Royster, Environmental Protection and Native American Rights: Controlling
Land Use Through Environmental Regulation, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 89, 90 (1991). See generally
Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights and the Federal Trust Responsibility, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J.
399, 408-09, 411, 431-32 (2006) (highlighting that, unlike policy on tribal land ownership and
governance, policy on water resomce development by Indians on reserve lands has never been
addressed comprehensively; Congress and state courts continue to protect existing non-Indian uses over
senior tribal water rights).
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treaties resulted in the termination of tribal powers over those ceded areas. 54
In some instances, though, the tribes maintained hunting, fishing,
agricultural, and other specific property use rights over the ceded lands. 55
Subsection II.D discusses how these provisions encumber the exploitation
of natural resources over these former tribal lands that were ceded to the
United States. 56
Generally, three fundamental principles of Indian tribal power govern
the notion of sovereignty among Indian nations:
(1) an Indian tribe possesses ... all the inherent powers of any
sovereign state; (2) a tribe's presence within the territorial
boundaries of the United States subjects the tribe to federal
legislative power and precludes the exercise of external powers

54. COHEN'S, supra note 47, § 4.02(2).
55. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 106-07 (1993) (suggesting that after the end of
the federal government's termination policy, the Indian tribes' efforts in litigation and legislation
succeeded in "reassuming political control over [the tribes'] economic and cultural destinies"); Nicholas
A Fromherz & Joseph W. Mead, Equal Standing with States: Tribal Sovereignty and Standing After
Massachusetts v. EPA, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 160 (2010) (discussing tribal sovereignty and tribal
authority over reservation lands); Sandra B. Zellmer, Indian Lands as Critical Habitat for Indian
Nations and Endangered Species: Tribal Survival and Sovereignty Come First, 43 S.D. L. REV. 381,
406-07, 414, 416, 422-23 (1998) (explaining that the Secretarial Order on Tribal Rights, Trust
Responsibilities and Endangered Species directs Departments, when creating critical habitats under the
Endangered Species Act, to recognize tribal sovereignty, work with tribes on federal programs, and
consider the impact of listing species on the tribes' use of such species. The Order also evidences a
substantive policy of prioritizing tribal needs for conservation and utilization of resomces, and
acknowledges that traditional ecological values may adequately protect reservations.); Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, The Comparative Rights of Indispensable Sovereigns, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 15 (2004) (stating
that tribes would retain hunting, fishing, and gathering rights in treaty agreements); Patrice H. Kunesh,
Tribal Self-Determination in the Age of Scarcity, 54 S.D. L. REV. 398, 402 (2009) (describing the
sovereign immunity that extends to tribal commercial activities); Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D.
Osborne, "Indian Country" and the Nature and Scope of Tribal Self-Governance, 22 ALASKA L. REV.
1, 11 (2005) (explaining that tribal self-government authority to enforce hunting and fishing regulations
apply outside Indian Country in some instances); Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A
Defense ofFederal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 102033 (1981) (arguing that the failme of assimilation and termination policies in the past, and existing
contractual obligations to Indian tribes, justify maintaining federal policy honoring tribes' property use
rights over ceded lands); Dennis W. Arrow, Oklahoma's Tribal Courts: A Prologue, the First Fifteen
Years of the Modern Era, and a Glimpse at the Road Ahead, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 5, 8-44 (1994)
(discussing the history of tribal court jmisdiction in Oklahoma); Michael E. Webster, Native American
Jurisdiction and Permitting, 1995 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1, 12-25 (giving an example of a tribe
that required pipeline companies seeking rights-of-way through tribal land to agree to use the pipeline to
transport gas belonging to the tribe, via tribal law); Rebecca Tsosie, The Challenge of "Differentiated
Citizenship:" Can State Constitutions Protect Tribal Rights?, 64 MONT. L. REV. 199, 221 (2003)
(describing the cultural status of Native Americans).
56. See infra Parts ILD.1-ILD.3 (describing tribal environmental challenges).
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of sovereignty of the tribe . . . but does not by itself affect the
internal sovereignty of the tribe; and (3) inherent tribal powers
are subject to qualification by treaties and by express legislation
of Congress, but except as thus expressly qualified, full powers
of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their
duly constituted organs of government. 57
These principles elucidate the multiplicity and complexity of variables
imposed on the tribal trust duty and the treatment of Indian tribes in
American courts. 58 Issues of federalism and sovereignty surface on another
plane because of concerns of states' rights. 59 This divide between federal
Indian law and state environmental law provides an avenue for tribes to
seek redress for property rights and environmental claims in state courts,
federal courts, and even in the domain of international law. 60
The longest pending case of the Supreme Court 2015 term, Dollar
General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, ended in a four-four
per curiam opinion affirming the lower court ruling. 61 Legal scholars are
grappling with the impact of the case. Some argue that Dollar General
reinforces existing judicial precedent regarding tribal sovereignty, while
others contend that the case expands the parameters of tribal jurisdiction. 62
57. COHEN'S, supra note 47, § 4.02(1).
58. Id.
59. See Alyeska Pipeline v. Kluti Kaah Native Vil!., 101 F.3d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1996)
(discussing the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act and federally reserved rights-of-way on tribal land
for the use of pipelines); Blackfeet Indian Tribe v. Mont. Power Co., 838 F.2d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that the federal government can grant 20-year or 50-year rights-of-way for pipelines on
Indian reservations, provided that the government obtains tribal consent); N. Border Pipeline Co. v.
Montana, 772 P.2d 829, 831(Mont.1989) (describing how Indian reservations are a creation of federal
law, making a state's laws inapplicable to the conduct of Indians on the reservation); South Dakota v.
U.S. Dep't of Interior, 665 F.3d 986, 990-91 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that South Dakota had
constitutional standing to challenge the Secretary of the Interior's land-into-trust acquisition because
such acquisition will deprive South Dakota of additional tax revenues. The court ultimately dismissed
the suit for failing to satisfy prudential standing requirements.); Washoe Tribe ofNev. v. Sw. Gas Corp.,
No. CV-N-99-153-ECRVPC, 2000 WL 665605, at *3 (D. Nev. Jan. 12, 2000) (declining to apply the
state statute oflimitations on an Indian land claim).
60. See McCarthy, supra note 23, at 20, 77-91 (citing and discussing federal and state cases,
laws, and regulations involving tribal property rights and environmental concerns); Michael C. Blumm
& Brett M. Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary Profit and Habitat Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A
Property Rights Approach, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 407, 489 (1998) (discussing tribal claims of habitat
protection for treaty fishing rights in federal court).
61. Dollar General Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, No. 13-1496 (U.S. June 23,
2016).
62. See, e.g., Ed Gehres, Opinion Analysis: Dollar General, the Court's Longest Pending Case
of the 2015 Term is a Four-Four Per Curiam Opinion, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2016, 9:28 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-dollar-general-the-courts-longest-pending-caseof-the-2015-term-is-a-fom-fom-per-cmiam-opinion/ (discussing the limited trial jmisdiction under
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The case's implications to tribal sovereignty are particularly important in
the environmental context.
B. Nature ofAboriginal Title Under International Law

International legal norms acknowledge aboriginal title. 63 This
recognition of aboriginal title stems from a move to bridge human rights
and environmental rights in the international context. 64 In an annual report
to the UN Human Rights Council, UN Special Rapporteur John Knox
highlighted transparency, public part1c1pation, accountability, and
redressability on the topic of human rights and environmental protection. 65
This linking of human rights to environmental rights corresponds with the
trend of bilaterally appreciating both human rights and indigenous rights. 66
At the 2015 Paris Climate negotiations, recognizing the foundation of
justice was critical to the formulation of the climate treaty. 67 The only
language in the Paris climate agreement referencing indigenous rights

Montana v. United States that remains a guiding principle); Rory E. Dilweg, Dollar General Upholds
Tribal
Jurisdiction
Status
Quo,
LAW360
(July
26,
2016,
4:15
PM),
https ://www. law360. com/articles/821665 I dollar-general-upholds-tribal-jurisdiction-status-quo (stating
that Dollar General keeps tribal jmisdiction at the status quo).
63. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, iJ 1 ("The Court, whose function is
to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply ...
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law .... "); U.N. Charter art. 92
("The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall
function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which . . . forms an integral part of the present
Charter."); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 38, May 23, 1969, 1980 U.N.T.S. 341
(providing that treaties may become binding on third parties through customary international law).
64. John H. Knox, Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue ofHuman Rights Obligations
Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy, and Sustainable Environment, iJ 2, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/28/61 (Feb. 3, 2015).
65. Id. at iii! 32-71. Knox outlined the following concerns: "(a) procedmal obligations to make
environmental information public, to facilitate public participation in environmental decision-making, to
protect rights of expression and association, [and] to provide access to legal remedies; (b) substantive
obligations, including obligations relating to non-State actors; (c) obligations relating to transboundary
harm; and (d) obligations relating to those in vulnerable situations." Id. at 1. He maps human rights
obligations relating to the environment, on the basis of an extensive review of global and regional
somces. Id.
66. Id. at iJ 2 (responding to the mandate to study the link between human rights and a healthy
environment); id. at iii! 99-100 (identifying the recognition of the legal rights of indigenous peoples in
natmal resomces as a good practice).
67. Alice Kaswan, The Paris Agreement and Theories of Justice, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE
REFORM BLOG (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfin?idBlog=CODE1418A53E-4A33-0EllF57Fl87F575B. See also Michael Liebreich, We'll Always Have Paris, BLOOMBERG
NEW ENERGY FIN. (Dec. 16, 2015), https://about.bnef.com/blog/liebreich-well-always-have-paris/
(attributing the success of the Paris Agreement to bottom-up pragmatism and States' understanding that
the only widely acceptable framework for the treaty was voluntary pledge and review).
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appears in the preamble, which is non-binding. 68 All other references to
indigenous people are in other non-binding parts. 69 Despite these
shortcomings, international law provides an avenue for redressability for
tribal communities. 70
James Anaya explored the international platforms to boost national and
subnational agreements with human rights norms. 71 Owen Lynch further
argued that legal recognition of aboriginal title by indigenous populations
and other long-term occupants is grounded in international law. 72 Lynch
recognized how this trend showcases enduring and unequal legal
arrangements, and "builds upon growing awareness that the local
knowledge and practices of long-term occupants often contribute to
conservation and sustainable management of forests and biodiversity. " 73
The idea of aboriginal title is grounded in Free Prior and Informed
Consent (FPIC), which "manifests [another] trend towards the development
of international law supportive of native/aboriginal title, including legal
standards that protect the rights, interest[s] and well-being of local rural
communities regarding the natural resources they depend on for their lives
and livelihoods."74 It continues with the following:
Similar to community-based property rights (CBPRs), including
native/aboriginal title, the right to prior informed consent of
indigenous and other local communities can be viewed as a
human right that derives its authority from and is recognized not
68. What the Paris Climate Agreement Means for Indigenous Rights and Hydroelectric Dams,
Eco WATCH (Dec. 14, 2015, 8:39 PM), http://ecowatch.com/2015/12/14/indigenous-rights-cop21/.
The only other mention includes a recognition of indigenous ecological
knowledge, although the wording provides no protection for such peoples. The
decision was made in part by pressme from the UK, Norway, the EU and the
U.S., who fear the legal liability that would follow a mandated recognition of
indigenous groups.
Id.
69. Id.
For example, any request following the auxiliary (helping) verb 'shall' is legally
binding; those following 'should' are not. The need to 'respect, promote ...
obligations on human rights ... the rights of indigenous peoples' falls under the
category of 'should' and is therefore not legally binding.
Id.
70. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 290 (2d ed. 2004).
71. Id. at 49.
72. Owen J. Lynch, Mandating Recognition: International Law and Aboriginal/Native Title, 1
PHIL. L. & Soc'y REV. 31, 37 (2011).
73. Id. at 38.
74. Id. (citing Anne Perrault et al., Partnerships for Success in Protected Areas: The Public
Interests and Local Community Rights to Prior Informed Consent (PIC), 19 GEO. INT'L ENVTL L. REV.
475, 517 (2007)).
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only by international law, but also natural law concepts; the
existence of a right to FPIC is not necessarily dependent on
governments or any creation, grant or recognition by a particular
nation state. 75
This analysis of international norms recognizing aboriginal title lays
the foundation for understanding the complex web of land title in what is
referred to as Indian lands. The interweaving definitions of aboriginal land,
title, and property rights on the international level meld with AngloAmerican frameworks for indigenous environmental constructs.
C. U.S. Reorganization and Regulation ofIndian Lands

The term "Indian Country" traces its origins to the 1763 Royal
Proclamation by King George of England to demarcate land belonging to
the British settlers and existing Indian natives. 76 The Indian Intercourse Act
of 1796 included the "first statutory definition of Indian country"77 and
stated Indian Country was "all lands beyond the western frontier. " 78 North
American courts have accepted the political autonomy and self-governing
system of the tribes. 79 The Supreme Court in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
classified tribes as "domestic dependent nations"; their "relation to the
United States resembles that of a ward to this guardian. " 80 In Worcester v.
Georgia, the Supreme Court explained this ward-guardian relationship in
which the United States was viewed as the "protector" of the Indian tribes, 81
"acknowledging and guaranteeing their security as distinct political
communities in exchange for their friendliness to the United States. " 82
75. Id. at 38-39 (footnote omitted).
76. See, e.g., Robert L. Lucero, Jr., State v. Romero: The Legacy of Pueblo Land Grants and
the Contours of Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 37 N.M. L. REV. 671, 679-80 (2007) (examining the
history of"Indian Country"); COHEN'S, supra note 47, § 3.01 (defining "Indian tribe," "Indian nation,"
"Indian," and "Indian Country" in federal law); Joseph D. Mata!, A Revisionist History of Indian
Country, 14 ALASKA L. REV. 283, 289 (1997) (detailing the origin of the term "Indian Country").
77. See, e.g., Lucero, supra note 76, at 680 (examining the history of"Indian Country"); Indian
Intercomse Act, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469, 469 (1796) (establishing boundary lines between the United States
and Indian tribes); COHEN'S, supra note 47, § 3.04(2)(b) (stating the definition of"Indian Country" in
the Trade and Intercomse Act).
78. Lucero, supra note 76 at 680. See also Indian Intercomse Act, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469, 469
( 1796) (describing the Western Frontier).
79. COHEN'S, supra note 47, § 4.0l(l)(a).
80. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). See also COHEN'S, supra note 47,
§ 4.0l(l)(a) (discussing court recognition of tribal political independence and self-governance in early
decisions).
81. Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 555 (1832); COHEN'S, supra note 47, § 4.0l(l)(a).
82. COHEN'S, supra note 47, § 4.0l(l)(a).
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The Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834 83 pushed Indian Country
westward and regulated individual conduct in Indian Country. 84 As a result
of forced relocations of Indians in the mid-nineteenth century, federal
Indian policy shifted to transferring Indians to reservation lands and
granting individual allotments of land in an effort to achieve assimilation. 85
These policies made those existing definitions of Indian Country untenable.
In 1874, the Indian Country definition was deleted from the revised
statutes, leaving courts to arbitrate the meaning of the term. 86 It is important
to note that the land where the Indians were relocated was less desirable to
the settlers, but it was also land that would lie in the path of future
hydrocarbon transport projects. 87 The geological formations that give rise to
hydrocarbon reserves are typically dry and arid, and were historically
located in remote and previously unsettled areas. 88 These tribal lands
became valued later due to their natural resources. 89
For purposes of property disputes and environmental claims, the courts
rely on the definition set out in the criminal law statutes for Indian
Country. 90 While this definition provides bounds for legal rules and
ancillary duties, it fails to account for the complexities and nuances of
environmental, regulatory, and property law regimes. Having a rigid
definition of Indian land impairs the tribes' ability to protect activities on
lands that would impact Indian land and ways of life. A more accurate
definition of Indian land would account for the absence of property rights
and the negative externalities of commercial development and hydrocarbon
transport. The standard for Indian Country was developed in United States
v. McGowan, 91 and refined in United States v. John 92 and Oklahoma Tax

83. Trade and Intercomse Act, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, 729 (1834) (codified as amended 25 U.S.C.

§ 177 (2012))
84. See COHEN'S, supra note 47, § 3.04(2)(b) (summarizing the provisions of the 1834 Trade
and Intercomse Act, as including, but not limited to: "substantive laws governing trade, non-Indian
trespass, crimes, [and] liquor traffic").
85. COHEN'S, supra note 47, § 1.04.
86. See Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 206-08 (1877) (analyzing the definition of Indian
Country). "[A]ll the country described by the act of 1834 as Indian country remains Indian country so
long as the Indians retain their original title to the soil, and ceases to be Indian country whenever they
lose that title, in the absence of any different provision by treaty or by act of Congress." Id. at 209.
87. MAURA GROGAN ET AL., NATIVE AMERICAN LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT 6 (2011).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Trade and Intercomse Act, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, 729 (1834) (codified as amended 25 U.S.C.
§ 177 (2012)).
91. United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 538 (1938).
92. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648 (1978).
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Commission v. Potawatomi Tribe. 93 The Court in Potawatomi held that
Indian Country was land that has been "validly set apart for the use of the
Indians as such, under the superintendence of the [g]ovemment. " 94
In lieu of expanding the definition of what constitutes Indian Country,
Congress should tum to its trust duties to tribes for preserving and
protecting tribal lands and tribal peoples. 95 This protection of Indian land
would also improve cultural heritage, environmental stewardship, and
commerce. The next section explores development of the federal right-ofway law in Indian Country to show the imperative of tribal environmental
sovereignty concerns. This historical process of obtaining a right-of-way
grant in Indian Country demonstrates how the interests of the tribes were
secondary to non-Indian commercial interests and state goals for land
allocation.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL SOVEREIGNTY AND HYDROCARBON TRANSPORT

A. Governing Law for Right-of-Way Doctrine on Indian Lands
The right-of-way grant on non-Indian lands is treated as an easement. 96
However, in Indian Country, land encumbered by the right-of-way is
treated as fee simple. 97 The difference between treatment of the land
encumbered by the right-of-way in Indian lands and non-Indian lands is
peculiar. Pipeline rights-of-way over private, non-Indian lands are acquired
via grant or prescription. 98 A pipeline owner's rights on non-Indian lands

93. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 511
(1991). See also Brent Eckersley, Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island v. Narragansett Electric
Company: When Dependent Indian Communities Fall Within Indian Country, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
193, 197 (1997) (discussing the Supreme Court's holding in Potawatomi); Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Oklahoma, 829 F.2d 967, 973 (10th Cir.1987) (holding that Indian Country includes lands owned by
the tribe); Weddell v. Meierhenry, 636 F.2d 211, 212 (8th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. McGowan
as an early case defining Indian land); United States v. Morgan, 614 F.2d 166, 170 (8th Cir.1980)
(explaining that an area was non-Indian based on the number of non-Indian inhabitants); John, 437 U.S.
at 649 (explaining that once Congress declares land a reservation, it is Indian Country); Narragansett
Indian Tribe ofR.L v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 878 F. Supp. 349, 355 (D.R.L 1995), ajf'd in part, rev'd
in part, 89 F.3d 908 (1st Cir. 1996) (discussing the court's analysis when reviewing state authority to
regulate activities within Indian Country).
94. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 511 (quoting John, 437 U.S. at 648-49).
95. Angela R. Riley, Indian Remains, Human Rights: Reconsidering Entitlement Under the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49, 74 (2002).
96. Sean Cassidy & Robert H. Stone, Jr., Old Right-of-Way, New Pipe: The Right to Enlarge
Pipelines and Related Equipment, 34 ENERGY & MIN. L. FOUND. 573, 576 (2013).
97. Id. at 578-79.
98. Cassidy & Stone, supra note 96, at 575-78 (2013); C.S. Patrinelis, Annotation, Correlative
Rights of Dominant and Servient Owners in Right of Way for Pipeline, 28 A.L.R.2d 626, 629 (1953). "A
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are easements on another's property. 99 One of the essential facets to full
enjoyment of a pipeline easement is that it is accessible. 100
In contrast, rights-of-way on Indian land are similar to fee simple lands
and offer the easement holder more rights compared to rights-of-way on
private, non-Indian lands. 101 Pipeline operators and utility companies have
more rights and better access to the land. Until now, the process of
obtaining a right-of-way in Indian Country had been extremely
bureaucratic. 102 However, the revised set of regulations minimized the
procedural hurdles that historically slowed the processing of right-of-way
requests. 103 The advent of amended federal right-of-way regulations in
Indian Country, 25 C.F.R. part 169, streamlined the process and allowed
projects to move forward with less delay. 104 Therefore, as the easement
holder in Indian Country acquires more rights, the tribe's rights decrease
with each grant of a right-of-way easement on tribal lands. 105 Tribes need
right of way for a pipeline acquired by prescription is dependent upon the character and extent of the use
established." Id. See also Strahm v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., No. 1-10-60, 2011 WL 915575, at *7, *8
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2011) (denying summary judgment for a defendant claiming the right to clear
the area of the easement, including rights-of-way, to maintain its pipeline. The court found that such
clearing did not constitute "maintenance" because the defendant was not performing maintenance at the
time of the clearing. Moreover, defendant failed to show facts on record proving that clearing the area
was necessary to maintain its pipeline.); Alban v. R.K. Co., 239 N.E.2d 22, 24 (Ohio 1968) (holding that
a right-of-way grant is an easement of passage granted for useful, proper purposes); Munchmeyer v.
Emfield, No. 95CA7, 1996 WL 142579, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1996) (restating the majority rule
that in cases where the right-of-way does not describe dimensions, courts will fix dimensions
"reasonable to accomplish the purposes of the easement"); Palmer v. Newman, 112 S.E. 194, 196-97
(W. Va. 1922) (stating that, "[t]he servient estate cannot be bmdened by the occupancy of a greater
width than is reasonably necessary for the purposes for which the right of way was intended").
99. Cassidy & Stone, supra note 96, at 575-78.
100. Id. at 585-86. Without such right, the easement would eventually become useless because
leaks, breaks, and other defects would cause loss of the material transported. Pipeline right-of-way
grants which are typically unrestricted "often contemplate the grantor's use of the smface for a
particular purpose, such as farming, and contain provisions which place restrictions on the grantee's
incidental use of the premises." Id. at 585.
101. Cassidy & Stone, supra note 96, at 578-79.
102. See Rights-of-Way on Indian Land, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,455, 34,455 (proposed Jun. 17, 2014)
(to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 169) (proposing changes to 25 USC § 169 in order to streamline and
clarify the processes involved in obtaining a right-of-way over Indian land).
103. See Rights-of-Way on Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,492, 72,492 (Nov. 19, 2015) (to be
codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 169) (updating the process for obtaining rights-of-way on Indian land).
104. See id. (summarizing the changes made by the new rule).
105. See, e.g., Russel L. Barsh, Grounded Visions: Native American Conceptions of Landscapes
and Ceremony, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 127, 137-41 (2000) (arguing that existing federal laws offer
only limited protection over "individual elements of Native American landscapes," such as history,
shared meaning, and indigenous knowledge systems that are embedded in the landscape); Ezekiel J.
Williams, Lands and Natural Resources Survey, 70 DENY. U. L. REV. 811, 824, 832 (1993) (discussing
that the BIA can approve oil and gas leases on tribal land as long as it considers the economic, social,
and environmental effects on the tribe, although the economic factors are the most important to the
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greater procedural remedies to protect their lands and peoples because of
this unusual legal predicament.
The unique legal status of tribes leads to variations in the way agencies
administer laws applicable to easements compared to common property
law. 106 There is a multifarious statutory and regulatory scheme that controls
how an individual obtains an easement across Indian lands. 107 The precise
legal status of these easements impacts the tribes' land rights and
environmental sovereignty and affects the duties and burdens of the various
entities that are easement holders. The Ninth Circuit considered the Strate
factors in determining that a state highway, another type of easement, was
the "equivalent of non-Indian fee land." 108 Todd Miller argues that the
holding in Big Horn was an attack on tribes' ability to govern due to the
adverse impact on tribal taxation, which is crucial to tribal sovereignty. 109
Jessie Owley notes that the federal courts have been hesitant to apply any of
the exceptions outlined in Montana v. United States. 110 In the future, courts
are unlikely to extend greater property rights to Native Nations that have
court); Sandra B. Zellmer, Sustaining Geographies of Hope: Cultural Resources on Public Lands, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 413, 414-18 (2002) (arguing that neither the First Amendment nor the Equal Protection
Clause necessarily prevent statutory authorities from reasonably accommodating tribal cultural practices
in facilitating the interests of American Indian tribes over resources and properties); Martin Nie, The
Use of Co-Management and Protected Land-Use Designations to Protect Tribal Cultural Resources and
Reserved Treaty Rights on Federal Lands, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 585, 585-86 (2008) (suggesting that
cooperative management arrangement and protected land use designations could protect cultural
resources); Sandra B. Zellmer, The Protection of Cultural Resources on Public Lands: Federal Statutes
and Regulations, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10689, 10689-90, 10705 (2001) (assessing the adequacy offederal
laws governing the management and protection of American Indian cultural resources in providing
grounds for accommodating American Indian cultural interests in public lands).
106. Miller, supra note 9, at 105.
107. 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-328 (2012). 25 C.F.R. §§ 169.1-169.28 (2016) (prescribing the
procedures, terms, and conditions under which rights-of-way over tribal lands may be granted).
108. Big Hom Cty. Elec. Coop. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Strate v. Al Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 454-56 (1997)). The Montana line of cases includes the following:
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547, 566-67 (1981) (reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision that
the Tribe had authority to prohibit all hunting and fishing by non-Indians within the reservation
boundaries); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
422-23 (1989) (holding that the Yakima Nation no longer retained "exclusive use and benefit" over all
the land within the reservation because the disputed land was alienated under the Indian General
Allotment Act. As in Montana, the Court concluded that the purpose of the allotment policy was to
destroy tribal government. Therefore, non-Indians purchasing allotted land do not fall within tribal
jurisdiction.); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 697 (1993) (holding that the Flood Control Act
and the Cheyenne River Act abrogated the Tribe's "absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of
tribal lands and deprived the Tribe of its ability to regulate non-Indian use of tribal land).
109. Miller, supra note 9, at 106.
110. Jessie Owley, Tribes as Conservation Easement Holders: Is a Partial Property Interest
Better than None?, in TRIBES, LAND, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 181 (Sarah Krakoff & Ezra Rosser eds.,
2012).
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territory used for the purpose of pipeline infrastructure projects. 111
Therefore, the onus to protect the tribal land interests rests with Congress
and the Executive Branch. Daniel Etsy notes, "how so much development
proceeds with so little scrutiny from local environmental authorities or any
other level of govemment." 112 He explains that this paradox comes from
conceptualizations of private property as sacred, and that land use
restrictions are subject to demanding reviews. 113 Access to mineral rights
and preservation of sacred tribal space is an ongoing conflict because of the
multiplicity of environmental rights and the amount of energy infrastructure
projects. 114
During the notice period, several commentators addressed this issue of
the conversion of Indian land to fee land with the right-of-way
developments. 115 They raised these concerns to the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) in the rule-making comment period for 25 C.F.R. part 169,
referencing Strate v. A-1 Contractors. 116 The commentators noted, "when a
landowner grants a right-of-way, they reserve no right to the exclusive
111. See Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict Between the "Public Trust" and the "Indian Trust"
Doctrines: Federal Public Land Policy and Native Nations, 39 TuLSA L. REV. 271, 279-81 (2003)
(highlighting the trend in Supreme Court cases lessening the federal government's fiduciary obligation
to native tribes).
112. Daniel C. Esty, Preface to NEW GROUND: THE ADVENT OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
xvi (John Nolan ed., 2003).
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Hester, supra note 10 (noting various degrees of protection to the environment,
cultural and historical resomces, and sacred sites); Colby L. Branch, Accessing Indian Lands for
Mineral Development, 5 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 3 (2005) (stating that mineral developers have
access and use problems for projects on tribal lands because of the fragmented ownership governed by
federal law); Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal
Control Over Mineral Resources, 29 TuLSA L.J. 541, 583 (1994) (discussing the government's
curtailment of tribal participation in mineral leases); Stan N. Harris & Carla Mattix, Sacred Sites and
Cultural Resource Protection: Implications for Mineral Development On - and Off - Indian Lands, 5
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 7-1, 7-1 (2005) (discussing selected federal, state, and tribal laws protecting
sacred tribal sites that may impact mineral development on and off tribal land); Dean B. Suagee, Tribal
Voices in Historic Preservation: Sacred Landscapes, Cross-Cultural Bridges, and Common Ground, 21
VT. L. REV. 145, 170-74 (1996) (discussing federal treatment of Indian sacred spaces on federal lands
under the National Historic Preservation Act); Lakshman Guruswamy et al., Protecting the Cultural and
Natural Heritage: Finding Common Ground, 34 TuLSA L.J. 713, 744 (1999) (discussing the importance
of protecting indigenous peoples' cultmal heritage); Andrew L. Adler & Stephen K. Urice, Resolving
the Disjunction Between Cultural Property Policy and Law: A Call for Reform, 64 RUTGERS L. REV.
117, 120 (2011) (describing the conflict between archaeologists, collectors, and dealers of cultural
property at sacred tribal spaces); Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of
Cultural Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 670-71 (1995) (discussing the variations in
legal treatment of cultural property due to conflicts between political groups and cultural groups).
115. Rights-of-Way on Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,492, 72,494 (Nov. 19, 2015) (to be
codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 169).
116. Id. (citing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456-57 (1997)).
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dominion or control over the right-of-way, and the land underlying the
right-of-way is removed from tribal jurisdiction." 117 The commentators
further argued, "the Strate holding means there can be no 'seamless
consistency' between the right-of-way regulations and leasing regulations,
because this precedent treats land subject to a right-of-way differently from
leased land." 118 The BIA responded that the ruling in Strate was factspecific, because the federal government and the tribe failed to expressly
reserve jurisdiction in the grant of the right-of-way. 119 The BIA
distinguished the changes in these regulations by stating that the United
States, as the grantor, "[preserves] the tribes' jurisdictions in all right-ofway grants issued under these regulations and [requires] that such grants
expressly reserve tribal jurisdiction." 120 The BIA either oversimplified the
rights issues in Indian lands or overestimated U.S. ability as trustee to
protect the Native American's land rights. The complicated system of
treaties between Native Nations and the federal government, and the
delicate web of historical title documents, is difficult to navigate in tracing
precise title to land, especially for lands in the Western United States. In
theory, grants of rights-of-way under these regulations are identical to fee
lands, but because of the historical environmental and land transgressions
against Native Nations, these regulations undermine an already weak
system of Native Nations' title to Indian lands.
The last time a seismic legislative shift occurred involving energy
easements in Indian Country was in the 1980s, when several natural gas
pipeline rights-of-way on Indian reservations expired and pipeline
companies sought renewals. 121 This marked the first time that the Indian
tribes withheld consent for encumbrances and challenged the right-of-way
renewals in court. 122 Because of the uncertainty in federal Indian law, the
courts considered the enforceability of a tribe's refusal to consent to a rightof-way.123 At the time, some argued that if the courts enforced the tribes'
consent requirements, the tribes would effectively hold veto power over

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. The BIA noted, "[t]his lack of reservation of a 'gatekeeping right' led the Supreme
Court to consider the right-of-way as aligned, for purposes of jurisdiction, with land alienated to nonIndians." Id.
120. Id.
121. Montgomery, supra note 7, at 222.
122. Federal Protection ofIndian Resources: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Ad.min. Practice
and Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 1716-18 (1972) (statement of Director, Office
of Indian Water Rights).
123. Montgomery, supra note 7, at 221.
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federal administrative decisions. 124 However, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) countered that rejecting the tribes' consent
requirements would give the agency power to approve the use of Indian
lands against the tribes' wishes. 125
Since the 1980s, court decisions involving the law of right-of-way in
Indian Country, particularly in the case of pipeline siting and permitting,
have further eroded land rights of Native Nations. This encroachment-at
times gradual and other times direct-runs counter to the overarching intent
of federal Indian law to protect American Indians and care for Native lands.
During the same period, the majority of court decisions made in the 1980s
were not in favor of Indian interests. 126
The law governing energy rights-of-way in Indian Country is unsettled,
but these regulations remained the same until the recent update. 127 The
revised regulations create a more streamlined process for obtaining right-ofway grants and allowed for tribal parties to be economic players. 128
However, the updated regulations also increased hydrocarbon infrastructure
projects and caused adverse environmental and public health consequences.
Federal law provides for pipeline rights-of-way over public and private
lands, including tribal lands. 129 The rights-of-way for oil and gas pipelines,
pumping stations, or tank sites shall not extend beyond a term of 20 years,
and may be extended for another period not exceeding 20 years following
the procedures set out in 25 C.F .R. § 169 .19. 130 The next subsection
124. Id. at 222-23.
125. Id. at 223.
126. Eighty percent of cases decided against Indian interests. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian
Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86
MINN. L. REV. 267, 296 n.116 (2001).
127. Rights-of-Way on Indian Land, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,455, 34,455 (proposed Jun. 17, 2014) (to
be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 169) (stating the last update for the regulations was in 1980).
128. See, e.g., Michael P. O'Connell, Fundamentals of Contracting By and With Indian Tribes,
3 AM. INDIAN L.J. 159, 178-79 (2014) (listing a number of statutes authorizing rights-of-way over tribal
land); Lynn H. Slade, Indian Tribes-Business Partners and Market Participants: Strategies for Effective
Tribal/Industry Partnership, 2011 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 3B-20 (2011); (observing that the
Department of Interior's regulations expanded the consent requirement to include all Indian tribes, not
only those organized under the Indian Reorganization Act); Raymond Cross, Tribes as Rich Nations, 79
OR. L. REV. 893, 896 (2000) (stating the importance of tribal self-determination as a somce for tribal
economic development).
129. 25 U.S.C. § 323 (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 169.3 (2016). "Rights-of-way granted under that act
shall be subject to the provisions of this section as well as other pertinent sections of this part 169.
Except when otherwise determined by the Secretary, rights-of-way granted for such purposes under the
Act of February 5, 1948 (62 Stat. 17; 25 U.S.C. 323-328) shall also be subject to the provisions of this
section." Id. § 169.25(a). See also Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15
(D.D.C. 2013) (explaining that the BIA has promulgated regulations regarding easements over tribal
land that include specific provisions that govern oil and gas pipelines).
130. 25 U.S.C. § 321 (2012).

2017]

Trust or Bust

821

considers what exactly is considered "Indian Country" for purposes of these
right-of-way regulations.
B. Historico-Legal Analysis
Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has formed a bias against tribal
jurisdiction. Gregory Ablavsky believes this bias was "grounded not in text
but in problematic readings of history. " 131 This bias against tribal
jurisdiction coincided with the rise of hydrocarbon projects on tribal lands
in the past 40 years. 132 In reassessing the problematic interpretations of
history, the Dawes Act, or General Allotment Act of 1887, heralded a
systematic "process to allow for the large-scale transfer of communally held
tribal lands to individual tribal members and outright transfers of so-called
'surplus lands' to the federal govemment." 133
1. The Federal Rules (1887-1980)
a. General Allotment Act of 1887
In vying for land, non-Indians contended that Indians had excess land
and were eager to acquire Indian land for settlement and development
purposes. 134 Through the passage of the Dawes Act, the government
received 60 million acres of Indian land, either ceded to or purchased "for
non-Indian homesteaders and corporations as 'surplus lands. "' 135 "Under
the [Dawes Act], Indian allottees were declared 'incompetent' to handle
their land affairs and the United States would retain legal title to the land as
trustee for the allottee; Indian allottees only had beneficial or usufruct
title." 136 An allotment held in trust remains U.S. property in trust for the

131. Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE. L.J. 1012, 1086
(2015).
132. See Katherine Bagley, At Standing Rock, A Battle Over Fossil Fuels and Land, YALE
ENV'T 360 (Nov. 10, 2016), http://e360.yale.edu/features/at_standing_rock_battle_over_fossil_fuels_
and_land (interviewing Kyle Powys Whyte, an indigenous environmental justice expert, about the
impact of energy infrastructme, such as pipelines on Native American tribes throughout history).
133. Robert T. Anderson, Water Rights, Water Quality, and Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian
Country, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 195, 200 (2015) (detailing the Department of Interior's moratorium on
approval of tribal water codes). See also Judith V. Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1,
29-30 (1995) (explaining that federal authority supersedes tribal authority).
134. History of Allotment, INDIAN LAND TENURE FOUND., https://www.iltf.org/resomces/landtenme-history/allotment (last visited May 8, 2017).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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allottee' s use and benefit. 137 With an allotment held in trust, the allottee' s
rights are not absolute. 138 However, "[t]he terms of the trust must be
construed in favor of the Indians. " 139 The Dawes Act establishes "only a
limited trust relationship," 140 but it "does not constitute an undertaking by
the government to manage the land resources of reservations for the
optimum economic benefit of the Indians. " 141
What is critical is that the terms of the trust should be construed in the
favor of the Indians. Court decisions do not reflect the intent of these
allotment rules. 142 Future litigation challenges to pipeline siting and
permitting can emphasize the legislative intent. Even if the rights of the
allottee are absolute, the United States still has a trust duty toward the tribes
for their optimal economic benefit. Courts should not construe the provision
for "economic benefit" to mean rapid development and exploitation of
hydrocarbons with limited regard for air, water, soil, and land. Preserving
environmental rights and tribal sovereignty also adds tangible economic
value to tribal lands and property.
137. 42 C.J.S. Indians § 97 (2007). See also Begay v. Albers, 721 F.2d 1274, 1279 (10th Cir.
1983) (observing that, "[t]he United States holds legal title to the allotted-patented land in trust for the
Indians"); Ahboah v. Hous. Auth. of the Kiowa Tribe of Indians, 660 P.2d 625, 632-33 (Okla. 1983)
(finding that the United States did not intend to delegate authority over trust property to the state, nor
did the Oklahoma Legislature intend to grant state agencies such authority); United States v. S. Pac.
Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 1976) (observing that Indian lands are held in trust for the
individual Indian to whom the allotment was made).
138. 42 C.J.S. Indians § 97 (2007). See also Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598, 609 (1970)
(finding that allottees do not have absolute power to make testamentary dispositions).
139. 42 C.J.S. Indians § 97 (2007). See also Cty. of Thmston v. Andrus, 586 F.2d 1212, 1222
(8th Cir. 1978) (concluding that the special historic relationship between the federal government and the
Indian tribes requires construction in favor of the Indians when interpreting rights conferred under a
trust).
140. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980). See also 42 C.J.S. Indians§ 97 (2007)
(discussing the effect of the trust relationship).
141. United States v. Anderson, 625 F.2d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1980). See also 42 C.J.S. Indians
§ 97 (2007) (discussing the effect of the trust relationship).
142. See, e.g., DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 445 (1974) (construing an 1891
legislative act to find that the Lake Traverse Reservation was entirely terminated); Indian Country,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 829 F.2d 967, 979 (10th Cir.1987) (reasoning that Congress's promise to
protect the Creek from state laws via the Creek Allotment Agreement also preserved federal authority
over the Tribe's land); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (holding that tribes do not
have jmisdiction over non-Indians unless necessary to ensme that tribal members may be governed by
their own laws); United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 489 (2003) (holding that a tribe's right
to compensation for mismanaged resomces or tribal lands does not accrue from the general trust
relationship between the tribe and the federal government. A tribe must prove that the statute from
which the tribe is claiming compensation establishes the right to compensation.); Oglala Sioux Tribe v.
U.S. Army Corps ofEng'rs, 537 F. Supp. 2d 161, 172 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that the Tribe does not
have a valid trust claim against the Army Corps); Nance v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 645 F.2d 701, 711 (9th
Cir. 1981) (holding that the EPA fulfilled its trust duties to the tribe).
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b. Rights-of-Way for Pipelines: 25 U.S.C. § 321 (1904)
25 U.S.C. § 321 governs the granting of a right-of-way on tribal
lands. 143 The statute in relevant part states:
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized and empowered to
grant a right-of-way in the nature of an easement for the
construction, operation, and maintenance of pipe lines for the
conveyance of oil and gas through any Indian reservation,
through any lands held by an Indian tribe or nation in the former
Indian Territory, through any lands reserved for an Indian agency
or Indian school, or for other purpose in connection with the
Indian Service, or through any lands which have been allotted in
severalty to any individual Indian under any law or treaty, but
which have not been conveyed to the allottee with full power of
alienation upon the terms and conditions herein expressed. 144

The language here is critical because what constitutes "tribal lands" is
far broader than the statutory definition of "Indian Country." The
Department of Interior's power to grant a right-of-way relates not only to
reservation lands, but also to lands that the tribes occupy:
[l] lands held by an Indian tribe or nation in the former Indian
Territory; [2] lands reserved for an Indian agency or Indian
school, or for other purpose in connection with the Indian
Service; or [3] through any lands which have been allotted in
severalty to any individual Indian under any law or treaty. 145

This broad grant of power to allocate rights-of-way in 1904 did not
consider the intensity of hydrocarbon exploitation and development. The
law also granted the Secretary of the Interior the power to extend the right
to maintain any pipeline every 20 years. 146 The Act remains the seminal
piece of legislation on this topic. Given its scope, the practical result of this
Act is the giveaway of tribal land parcels. It is important to consider the
inequitable ramifications of this policy.

143. 25 U.S.C. § 321 (2012).
144. Id. The "former Indian Territory", referred to in text, was in the original "Indian Territory,"
and has been designated as former Indian Territory by virtue of the admission of such former Territory
and the Territory of Oklahoma to the Union as the State of Oklahoma. Act of June 16, 1906, Pub. L. No.
234, 34 Stat. 267.
145. 25 U.S.C. § 321.
146. Id.
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c. Rights-of-Way Through Public Lands, Indian, and Other Reservations for
Power and Communications Facilities: 43 U.S.C. § 961 (1911)
In 1911, 43 U.S.C. § 961 expanded the jurisdiction and scope of the
federal right-of-way law in Indian Country. 147 Here, the government is
"authorized and empowered" to grant right-of-way easements for up to 50
years:
from the date of the issuance of such grant, over, across, and
upon the public lands ... and reservations of the United States
for electrical poles and lines for the transmission and distribution
of electrical power, and for poles and lines for communication
purposes, and for radio, television, and other forms of
communication transmitting, relay, and receiving structures and
facilities .... 148

The statute also increased the length and width of the easements to 200
feet on either side (not to exceed 400 feet by 400 feet for transmission
lines). 149 The increasing area available for the easement grant reflected the
surge of energy and communication infrastructure projects.
d. Regulations 1928-1948
In 1928, the right-of-way regulations in Indian Country were updated
to specifically state that easement holders obtain easements at their own
risk. 150 In other words, the statute does not protect easement holders from
the threat posed by Native Nation members to commercial interests of nonIndian corporations, entities, and individuals. The rules do not account for
the dispossession of tribal lands from Native Nations and tribal members. 151
The Indian Right of Way Act of 1948 specifically mentions pipelines,
which subsequent regulations incorporated. 152 The new "regulations
promulgated under§ 321 will also apply to pipeline rights-of-way under the

147. 43 U.S.C. § 961 (2012).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See DEPT. OF INTERIOR, REGULATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
CONCERNING RIGHTS OF WAY OVER INDIAN LANDS 5 (1929) (providing that the officer in charge may
use his discretion to temporarily grant a right-of-way at the applicant's own risk).
151. See 25 U.S.C. § 5138 (2012) (noting that the land always goes back to the United States in
trust for the tribe).
152. See 25 U.S.C. § 321 (2012) (mentioning pipelines specifically); 25 C.F.R. § 169.25 (2016)
(mentioning pipelines specifically).
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1948 Act." 153 If the tribe consents, individual Indian landholders within a
reservation may not interfere with laying pipelines. 154
In 1948, the Ninth Circuit reconciled the 1948 and 1904 Acts. 155 The
court read that the two statutes as giving "the Tribe a choice between either
the 20-year term under the earlier statute or up to a 50-year term under the
latter statute. " 156 The court found it unnecessary to determine under which
statute the Department of Interior granted the rights-of-way at issue, even
though the 1904 Act specifies a maximum 20-year term. 157
2. Energy Policy Act of 2005
The Energy Policy Act addressed energy production in the United
States, including energy efficiency, renewable energy, oil and gas, coal,
tribal energy, nuclear matters and security, vehicle fuels (including ethanol,
hydrogen, and electricity), energy tax incentives, hydropower and
geothermal energy, and climate change technology. 158 Pursuant to the
Energy Policy Act of 2005, the DOI and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
prepared a joint report to Congress on issues associated with grants,
expansions, and renewals of energy rights-of-way on tribal lands. 159 The
Act defines tribal land as "any land or interests in land owned by any Indian
tribe, title to which is held in trust by the United States, or is subject to a
restriction against alienation under laws of the United States." 160 Section
1813(b) required a report to Congress with an analysis of compensation to
Indian tribes for grants, expansions, and renewals of energy rights-of-way
on tribal land; an analysis of tribal self-determination and sovereignty
interests relating to expansion, or renewal of energy rights-of-way on tribal
land; and information on national energy transportation policies about these
energy rights-of-way. 161
The Act encompassed hundreds of tribes as well as a wide variety of
energy rights-of-way on tribal lands. 162 As Paul Frye observed, Congress
153. Frye, supra note 33, at 84.
154. See Appleton v. Kennedy, 268 F. Supp. 22, 24 (N.D. Okla. 1967) (holding that the smface
owners were permanently enjoined from interfering with the laying of the pipeline).
155. Blackfeet Indian Tribe v. Mont. Power Co., 838 F.2d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 1988). See also
Frye, supra note 33, at 84 (discussing the court's holding in Blackfeet Indian Tribe).
156. Blackfeet Indian Tribe, 838 F.2d at 1059. See also 25 U.S.C. § 321 (allowing extension of
right-of-way terms for another 20 years); 25 C.F.R. § 169.25(b) (granting a term of20 years);
157. Blackfeet Indian Tribe, 838 F.2d at 1057.
158. Energy Policy Act of1992, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13201-13574 (2012).
159. Energy Policy Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1813(a)(l), 119 Stat. 1127 (2005).
160. 25 U.S.C. § 3501(12) (2012).
161. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 1813(b), 119 Stat. 1127, 1128 (2005).
162. Id.
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may have required the report out of concern that Indian energy rights-ofway issues might interfere with the interests of consumers or national
security. 163 Meanwhile, native nations, on their own, have been working to
address energy problems with their industry partners, thereby contributing
to national energy security. 164 In fact, "[t]ribal representatives have been
able to show that the amounts paid by energy consumers attributable to
Indian energy rights-of-way are wholly insignificant." 165
3. Rights-of-Way in Indian Country: 25 CFR part 169 (2016)
The rights-of-way regulations for Indian Country were originally
issued in 1968 and last revised in 1982. 166 In April 2016, new DOI
regulations comprehensively reformed the leasing process for Indian
land. 167 This revision specifically impacted oil and gas pipelines as well as
electric transmission and distribution lines-energy easements that are
essential for transporting natural resources and electricity. 168 What the DOI
described as a "supportive response to the leasing regulatory revisions" did
not, in fact, account for treaty provisions, indigenous tribal law and
customs, and tribal environmental justice considerations. 169 The DOI
amended these rules to account for fiber optic cable construction, yet they
had a secondary impact on the development of oil and gas pipelines and
other energy corridors.
The BIA suggested that the changes to 25 CFR part 169 (2014) did
"not constitute a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment because these are 'regulations . . . whose
environmental effects are too broad, speculative, or conjectural to lend
themselves to meaningful analysis and will later be subject to the NEPA
process, either collectively or case-by-case. "' 170 This statement is
technically and legally accurate because NEPA does not apply to the
revised regulations on its face. However, without a NEPA review, the
revised regulations fail to consider climate change impacts in the totality of
163. Frye, supra note 33, at 101.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 25 C.F.R. §§ 169.1-169.28 (2016).
167. Id.
168. Rights-of-Way on Indian Land, 79
codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 169).
169. Rights-of-Way on Indian Lands, 80
codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 169).
170. Rights-of-Way on Indian Land, 79
codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 169) (quoting 43 C.F.R.
exist that would require greater NEPA review.

Fed. Reg. 34,455, 34,459 (June 17, 2014) (to be
Fed. Reg. 72,492, 72,492 (Nov. 19, 2015) (to be
Fed. Reg. 34,455, 34,460 (June 17, 2014) (to be
§ 46.210(i) (2016)). No extraordinary circumstances
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the rules. The updates to the right-of-way regulations decreased the
difficulty in obtaining rights-of-way in Indian Country. Thus, the
cumulative effect of these rules will be the creation of more oil and gas
pipelines. So, despite President Obama's advocacy for enhanced climate
change governance, these rules will lead to more intensive oil and gas
development on tribal lands, as well as throughout the U.S, especially in the
era of the Trump administration. 171
In one sense, these rules are providing increased economic
opportunities for financially stressed and economically disadvantaged tribal
communities. The revised regulations are not meant to be mitigating factors
for project development. 172 Rather, at the core, they are designated to
streamline the right-of-way process so that tribes can come to the table as
equal partners. 173
4. NEPA in Indian Country
Further oil and gas development on tribal lands, whether intentional or
unintentional, is an inevitable consequence of these revised regulations.
Simultaneously, tribal communities with a clear connection to nature will
suffer deleterious direct and indirect climate change impacts as a result of
these regulations. Even if each separate project is subjected to a separate
NEPA examination, it is disingenuous to suggest that these rules would in
any way help the tribes achieve the necessary mitigation goals of climate
change policy. The lack of regulatory oversight for rulemaking is an
inherent failure of NEPA. While other checks exist on the process of these
regulations, NEPA, as the mother of environmental regulation, offers
171. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT'S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 12-16 (2013),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf.
172. See Rights-of-Way on Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,492, 72,492 (Nov. 19, 2015) (to be
codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 169) (describing that the general approach for the final rule was to provide
uniformity and "allow Indian landowners as much flexibility and control as possible over rights-of-way
on their land").
173. See, e.g., DAPL War Rages On: "Water Protectors" Arrested as Protests Continue, RT
NEWS (Dec. 30, 2016, 00: 4 5), https ://www.rt.com/usa/3 722 02-arrests-opposition-dapl-council/
(reporting on continuing conflict between Dakota Access Pipeline and Standing Rock Sioux Tribe);
Steven Mufson & Brady Dennis, Obama Administration Cancels Oil and Gas Leases on Blackfeet
Tribe's Sacred Grounds, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2016/ 11I161obama-administration-reaches-deal-to-cancel-oil-leases-on-lands-tied-totribe/?utrn_term=. bdd664fl9bce (quoting the chairman of the Blackfeet National Tribal Business
Council saying "[w]hile we're not opposed to oil and gas exploration, we are opposed to oil and gas
exploration in that area"); James Osborne, Behind Pipeline Protests, Tension Among Native Americans
Over Oil, Hous. CHRON. (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/article/Behindpipeline-protests-Native-American-9228077.php (describing the increasing friction between
environmental costs and monetary benefits of oil and gas development on Indian lands).
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limited protection to tribal commumtles in the path of energy
development. 174 Although NEPA is applicable in Indian Country, NEPA is
either underutilized or underemphasized. 175 Since these communities lack
clear environmental protections, large energy projects by multinational oil
and gas companies reduce the sovereignty element of tribal selfdetermination.176 The federal government here falls short in its role as a
fiduciary of the tribes. The U.S. Constitution does not protect the
environment. However, Congress has a moral obligation to serve in a
fiduciary capacity for the tribes. 177 This fiduciary role would require
recognizing the harms tribes suffer due to increased traffic from oil and gas
transport and other commercial activities.
Law serves simultaneously as a mechanism for anti-subordination and
as a tool for subjugation. 178 Lauralyn Whitt argues that indigenous rights
activists use a variety of legal tools and instruments to thwart ongoing
colonial processes. 179 While NEPA is applicable in Indian Country, its
effectiveness as a legal environmental protection measure is weak
compared to its force when similar actions occur on non-Indian lands. 180
Part II.C will consider the intent behind NEPA and its impact statement
prov1s10n. Part 11.D will analyze two recent tribal claims alleging NEPA
violations involving pipeline infrastructure projects to show how future
174. See generally Dean B. Suagee, The Application of the National Environmental Policy Act
to "Development" in Indian Country, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 377, 420-28 (1991) (discussing the
limitations of NEPA on Indian lands); Andrea S. Miles, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: Tools for
Achieving Energy Development and Tribal Self-Sufficiency or an Abdication of Federal Environmental
and Trust Responsibilities?, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 461, 466-67 (2006) (discussing the history of
NEPA and Indian lands).
175. Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that NEPA covers projects
on Indian lands).
176. See id. (finding that all lands of the United States are under NEPAjmisdiction).
177. See id. (stating that, "[t]he fact Indian lands are held in trust does not take it out ofNEPA's
jmisdiction").
178. Joanne Barker, For Whom Sovereignty Matters, in SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS: LOCATIONS
OF CONTESTATION AND POSSIBILITY IN INDIGENOUS STRUGGLES FOR SELF-DETERMINATION 1, 26
(Joanne Barker ed., 2005).
179. LAURELYN WHITT, SCIENCE, COLONIALISM, AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE: THE CULTURAL
POLITICS OF LAW AND KNOWLEDGE 178-79 (2009). Whitt demonstrates how the pmsuit of knowledge
of the natmal world impacts, and is impacted by, indigenous peoples rather than nation-states. In what
she refers to as "extractive biocolonialism," the valued genetic resomces and associated agricultmal and
medicinal knowledge of indigenous peoples are sought, legally converted into private intellectual
property, transformed into commodities, and then placed for sale in genetic marketplaces. Her study of
private intellectual property crosscuts private easement rights on tribal lands. Indigenous and Western
knowledge systems interact to shape the dynamics of power, the politics of property, and the apologetics
oflaw. Id.
180. See BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, INDIAN AFFAIRS NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT (NEPA) GUIDEBOOK 6 (2012) (describing the BIA role in the NEPA process on Indian lands).
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challenges on the basis of environmental law procedural grounds could be
strengthened.
Incidentally, the most important environmental justice concern in
Indian Country for the last three decades has been environmental programs
to regulate non-Indian facilities on tribal and privately owned lands. 181 A
flurry of court decisions show "an unprincipled and unpredictable trend of
restricting exercises of tribal sovereignty that affect non-Indian Americans
within tribal territories in a variety of non-environmental cases." 182 The
concern has been for Native Nations to maintain a level of sovereignty and
preserve their land and cultural values associated with the land. 183 This
meshing of environmental and property rights in Indian Country is unique
because of the sacredness of nature to indigenous peoples. As such, tribal
claims alleging NEPA violations can take advantage of the procedural
remedies available. 184 While state procedural remedies may be successful,
the federal government-as a trustee of tribal lands-has an explicit duty to
protect native environments that state governments do not. 185
C. Contextualizing Environmental Impact Statements

NEPA went into effect January 1, 1970, and had a broad set of
statutory goals. 186 With NEPA, Congress's goals were:
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to
promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare
of man; [and] to enrich the understanding of the ecological
systems and natural resources important to the Nation .... 187

NEPA articulates a national policy "to create and maintain conditions
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the
social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations

181. Grijalva, supra note 11, at 25.
182. Id. at 27 (citing David H. Getches, Conquering The Cultural Frontier: The New
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court ofIndian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (1996)).
183. Montgomery, supra note 7, at 198.
184. See Administrative Procedmes Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (setting forth the standards of
judicial review for agency actions meant to comply with a corresponding statute).
185. See Coast Indian Cmty. v. United States, 550 F.2d 639, 652-53 (CL Ct. 1977) (discussing
the federal government's duty as trustee).
186. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012).
187. Id.
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of Americans." 188 Its intent is to promote "the understanding of the
ecological systems and natural resources important to the United States. " 189
NEPA's requirements for the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
do not specifically mention the issues of climate change, global warming,
and/or greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs). 190 Yet, both state and federal
courts are beginning to scrutinize the EIS more closely in this regard. 191
This Article, inter alia, looks at how issues of climate change, global
warming, and GHGs can be factored into energy-siting projects in Indian
Country and other lands over which tribes still have rights.
NEPA does not consider environmental impacts beyond the U.S.
border, 192 and NEPA's equation for impact assessments does not consider
global climate or population impacts. The statutory focus of NEPA also
creates controversy over whether NEPA applies procedurally or
substantively. Mason Baker explains that some, in applying NEPA, take
into account the substantive meaning behind NEPA's provisions. Others
only consider the procedural components of NEPA, which require all
agencies to "utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will
insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the
environmental design arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may
have an impact on [the] environment." 193
Despite the lack of a private right of action, attorneys have been able to
address environmental concerns through the NEPA process, through other
executive and legislative action, media attention, grassroots organizations,
and (occasionally) in the courts. 194 Several courts have recently concluded
that agencies must analyze the effects of GHG emissions and global climate
change in their reviews of environmental impacts. 195 The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) "recognizes tribal sovereignty and encourages
tribal participation, if not complete management, of delegable
188. Id. § 4331(a).
189. Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756 (2004) (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4321 ).
190. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332 (noting the absence oflanguage referring to climate change, global
warming, or greenhouse gases).
191. See e.g., San Diego Navy Broadway Complex Coal. v. U.S. Dep't. of Def., 904 F. Supp. 2d
1056, 1061 (S.D. Cal. 2012)(taking climate change into consideration for the NEPA EIS requirements).
192. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332 (showing the absence of language requiring agencies to consider
international environmental impacts).
193. See id. § 4332(a) (showing no consideration of global environmental impacts).
194. Stephen M. Johnson, NEPA and SEPA 's in the Quest for Environmental Justice, 30 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. 565, 571 (1997).
195. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'! Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d
1172, 1198-1203 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing NHTSA's failme to consider the monetary benefits of
carbon emission reduction, and holding that the decision was arbitrary and capricious).
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environmental programs." 196 At the same time, Indian tribes have sought
recognition of their tribal governments to protect environmental quality. 197
This divide between the courts and the EPA is evident in pipeline-siting
cases on tribal lands. While federal law and policy would be the natural
choice for exercising and protecting tribal environmental and property
rights, national law and policy is not always the most effective mechanism
for doing so. The risks inherent in national, interstate, and international
cross-border energy projects reduces the efficacy of federal law and policy.
These laws are devised to protect individual and community rights, but they
are also created to promote and encourage investment. In balancing and
reconciling competing property rights and obligations, economic interests
of powerful utility providers, pipeline operators, and energy companies are
rarely subordinate to the interests and concerns of Native Nations. 198
196. Heather J. Tanana & John C. Ruple, Energy Development in Indian Country: Working
Within the Realm of Indian Law and Moving Towards Collaboration, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 23
(2012). Tanana and Ruple note:
The EPA has supported its policy by emphasizing the unique connection between
tribes and their land. Indian tribes, for whom human welfare is tied closely to the
land, see protection of the reservation environment as essential to preservation of
the reservations themselves. Environmental degradation is viewed as a form of
further destruction of the remaining reservation land base, and pollution
prevention is viewed as an act of tribal self-preservation that cannot be entrusted
to others.
Id. at 24 (quoting ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FEDERAL, TRIBAL, AND STATE ROLES IN THE PROTECTION
AND REGULATION OF RESERVATION ENVIRONMENTS 1 (July 10, 1991)). See also Judith V. Royster &
Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control of the Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation
and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REV. 581, 645-67 (1989) (summarizing the Supreme
Court's "fundamental 'traditional notions' of tribal sovereignty relevant to ... pollution control");
Roger Romulus Martella, Jr., "Not In My State's Indian Reservation"-A Legislative Fix to Close an
Environmental Law Loophole, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1863, 1872 (1994) (emphasizing that a balance must
be struck between upholding tribal sovereignty and ensming environmental protection); Daniel I.S.J.
Rey-Bear, The Flathead Water Quality Standards Dispute: Legal Bases for Tribal Regulatory Authority
Over Non-Indian Reservation Lands, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 151, 204 (1996) (analyzing jmisdiction
disputes between federal, tribal, and state environmental authorities); Richard A. Du Bey et al.,
Protection of the Reservation Environment: Hazardous Waste Management on Indian Law, 18 ENVTL.
L. 449, 487 (1988) (discussing the EPA's policy for implementing environmental programs on Indian
land. The EPA recognizes tribes' "fundamental legal jmisdiction" to regulate pollution somces on the
reservation.); Jennifer Smith Haner, Tribal Solutions to On-Reservation Environmental Offenses:
Jurisdictional Parameters, Cultural Considerations, and Recommendations, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
105, 114, 130 (1994) (pointing to the 1984 EPA Indian policy in which the EPA calls for federal
restraint and encomages tribes to take responsibility for enforcing environmental regulation on their
lands).
197. Tanana & Ruple, supra note 196, at 24.
198. See, e.g., Bradford D. Cooley, The Navajo Uranium Ban: Tribal Sovereignty v. National
Energy Demands, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 393, 393-97 (2006) (discussing the competing
interests of the Navajo nation and the federal government in the manium mining in Navajo country);
Associated Press, Judge Rejects Tribes' Request to Halt Dakota Access Pipeline Construction, CHI.
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D. Tribal Environmental Challenges

The ongoing alliance between the environmental movement and
American Indians is demonstrated in the indigenous struggle to halt the
Keystone XL pipeline project. The pipeline would transport crude oil from
environmentally sensitive areas of Canadian tar sands across potentially
culturally and ecologically sensitive areas in the United States. Since 2008,
pipeline proponents have been lobbying to expand the Keystone XL
pipeline by more than 1, 700 new miles. 199
The breakthrough Nebraska case of Thompson v. Heineman, involving
non-Indian ranchers, looked at the constitutionality of the approval process
for the Nebraska leg of the Keystone XL pipeline. 200 The case highlighted
the difficulty that Indian plaintiffs would encounter in bringing
constitutional, property rights, and environmental claims. 201 This disparity
in access to the courts raises concerns about the effectiveness of NEPA as a
litigation strategy for the tribes. Would the state courts be better equipped
to protect tribal environmental sovereignty than the federal courts? Why is
the federal government weaker in protecting tribal lands and environment?
In Thompson v. Heineman, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a
Nebraska law passed in 2012, which expedited the approval process for a
new controversial Keystone XL pipeline route through the State, was
unconstitutional. 202 Article IV, § 20 of the Nebraska Constitution authorizes
the Nebraska Public Service Commission (PSC) exclusive regulatory
control over common carriers. 203 The Court stated that oil pipeline carriers
subject to LB 1161 are common carriers, and that the PSC' s constitutionally
enumerated powers include the ability to evaluate and approve an oil
pipeline route through Nebraska. 204 LB 1161 temporarily or permanently
divested the PSC of control over oil pipeline routes subject to the Act.
Further, LB 1161 vested regulatory control over common carriers in the
TRIB. (Feb. 13, 2017, 2:26 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-judge-dakotaaccess-pipeline-work-20170213-story.html (reporting that a federal judge denied a request for a
temporary injunction amidst tribes' claims that affected water is important to the tribes' tradition); Joe
Heim, Native American Tribes Sense a Reawakening in Fight Over Oil Pipeline, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 8,
2016, 11 :21 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-native-american-tribes-oilpipeline-20160908-story.html (reporting a tribe's claim that the government broke treaties with tribes
"whenever economic interests outweighed tribal rights").
199. Brianna Lee, Keystone XL Pipeline, PBS (last updated Jan. 18, 2012),
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/five-things/the-keystone-xl-pipeline/12200/.
200. Thompson v. Heineman, 857 N.W.2d 731, 740 (Neb. 2015).
201. Id. at 745.
202. Id. at 746.
203. NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 20.
204. Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 746.
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Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality and the Governor, not in
the legislature. As a result, the Court held that LB 1161 clearly violates
Article IV, § 20, and was therefore unconstitutional. 205
The industry lobbyists in favor of the Keystone XL Pipeline had
greater resources than the opposition. 206 The original Keystone pipeline
operated by TransCanada Corp. runs from Hardisty, Alberta, Canada to
Wood Park and Patoka, Illinois; Steele City, Nebraska; and Cushing,
Oklahoma. 207 The updated Keystone XL Pipeline would consist of 1, 700
new miles of pipeline. 208 Nebraska cattle buyer Randy Thompson led
dozens of landowners in rejecting leases for the pipeline expansion project
in Thompson v. Heineman. 209 President Obama vetoed the bill for the
Keystone XL Pipeline and later denied the presidential permit, but the
Trump administration reversed course and approved the pipeline permit. 210
In fact, neither President Obama's earlier veto nor the Nebraska case would
have caused pipeline projects to wane. Instead, hydrocarbon construction
projects will continue to expand. Because of the new right-of-way
regulations in Indian Country and changes in federal leadership, those
energy projects will cross tribal lands. Balancing NEPA oversight and
environmental due process will be one way to protect native lands from
environmental degradation due to pipeline projects, notwithstanding the
inherent weaknesses of NEPA.
Prior to Thompson, American Indians put forward the first major legal
challenge to the initial Keystone pipeline by suing the U.S. Department of
State in Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. US. Department of State and
TransCanada Pipeline. In 2009, the U.S. District Court of South Dakota
205. Id. Prior to reaching the merits, the Court held that plaintiffs established taxpayer standing
to bring a constitutional challenge to the law, and that their claims were not rendered moot on January
22, 2013, when the Governor approved the Keystone XL route through the state. Id. at 745-46.
206. Colby Itkowitz, Lopsided Lobbying on Keystone Pipeline, WASH. POST (July 11, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/wp/2014/07I11 /lopsided-lobbying-on-keystonepipeline/.
207. Keystone
XL
Pipeline,
CTR.
FOR
CLIMATE
&
ENERGY
SOLS.,
http://www.c2es.org/energy/somce/oil/keystone (last visited May 8, 2017).
Is
the
Keystone
XL
Pipeline?,
NPR:
STATEIMPACT,
208. What
https://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/tag/keystone-xl-pipeline/ (last visited May 8, 2017).
209. Leslie Kaufinan, For the Keystone Battle, a Folk Hero, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2011, 3:10
PM), https:// green. blogs.nytimes.com/2011/ 10/18/for-the-keystone-battle-a-folk-hero/?_r= 1. Thompson
received the land from his mother, who had deeded him 400 acres of farmland in Martell, Nebraska
before she died last summer. Id.
210. Gregory Korte, Obama: Keystone Pipeline Bill 'Has Earned my Veto', USA TODAY (Feb.
25, 2015, 8 :03 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/02/24/obama-keystoneveto/23879735/. Fred Jauss, Despite Trump Approval, Keystone Pipeline Still Has Hurdles to Cross,
THE HILL, Mar. 27, 2017, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/energy-environment/326015-despitetrump-approval-keystone-still-has-hmdles-to
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dismissed the case in the early stages. 211 Yet, this South Dakota case,
brought by Nebraska and South Dakota tribes, is worth reconsidering.
Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate can serve as the basis for Indian plaintiffs to
challenge future energy-siting projects. In 2015, the Yankton Sioux Tribe
requested dismissal of TransCanada's prior application to certify its
existing construction, arguing that conditions of the original permit have
changed enough to require recertification. 212 If the South Dakota Public
Utilities Commission had granted the Yankton Sioux Tribe's request for
recertification, the pipeline operator, TransCanada, would have had to seek
a new permit in the South Dakota leg of the Keystone XL Pipeline. Instead,
the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission decided that TransCanada
would be able to meet the conditions of the original permit granted in 2010,
and rejected the recertification claim. 213 "American Indians have unique
vulnerabilities to the impacts of climate change impacts because of the links
among ecosystems, cultural practices, and public health, but also as a result
of limited resources available to address infrastructure needs. " 214

211. Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. U.S. Dep't of State, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1083 (D.S.D.
2009).
212.
Under [South Dakota] state law, any project that has not been started within fom
years of its original permit being granted must seek certification from the
commission . . . . The Yankton Sioux Tribe argues that the conditions in the
original permit have changed enough to get it tossed out. Among the differences
between the permit's initial granting in 2010 and the current version is that the
pipeline, originally slated to carry crude from the Alberta oil sands, has been
expanded to include oil from the Bakken formation under western North
Dakota ....
Yankton Sioux Lead Fight Against TransCanada and Keystone XL in South Dakota, INDIAN COUNTRY
MEDIA NETWORK (Jan. 5, 2015), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2015/0l/05/yanktonsioux-lead-fight-against-transcanada-and-keystone-xl-south-dakota-158562.
213. South Dakota PUC Certifies Keystone XL Construction Permit, S.D. PuB. UTILITIES
COMM'N (Jan. 5, 2016), https://puc.sd.gov/News/2016/01052016.aspx.
214. John T. Doyle et al., Exploring Effects of Climate Change on Northern Plains American
Indian Health, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN THE UNITED STATES: IMPACTS,
EXPERIENCES AND ACTIONS 135, 135-36 (Julie Koppel Maldonado et al. eds., 2013). For example,
[o]n the Crow Reservation in south-central Montana, a Northern Plains American
Indian Reservation, there are community concerns about the consequences of
climate change impacts for community health and local ecosystems. Observations
made by Tribal Elders about decreasing annual snowfall and milder winter
temperatmes over the 20th century initiated an investigation of local climate and
hydrologic data by the Tribal College. The resulting analysis of meteorological
data confirmed the decline in annual snowfall and an increase in frost free days.
In addition, the data show a shift in precipitation from winter to early spring....
Streamflow data showed a long-term trend of declining discharge. Elders noted
that the changes are affecting fish distribution within local streams and plant
species which provide subsistence foods. Concerns about warmer summer
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Tribes have brought forth NEPA claims, tied to National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA) and Administrative Procedure Act (APA) issues,
to contest pipeline permitting applications. 215 While a NEPA claim may
appear as an ideal litigation strategy, the courts have not viewed such
claims favorably. 216 Judicial interpretation of NEPA's language has
prevented tribes from obtaining a remedy through the statute. The failure of
tribal NEPA claims based on judicial precedent stems from the difficulty in
assessing environmental harm. Environmental damages are vastly more
intricate than monetary damages arising from claims for a contractual
breach in a construction contract or failure to perform under a services
contract. Environmental damages are multifaceted because of complex
economic, social, cultural, and ecological variables. N.B. Dennis notes that,
"most environmental conflicts are non-linear, characterized by multiple
'tracks' and multiple 'trains' (multiple stakeholders, resources, agency
mandates and programs, spatial and temporal scales, approaches,
objectives, and values)." 217 Environmentalists assess environmental
damages based on "loss of intrinsic biodiversity values and future options,"
whereas "land developers would assess damages in the currency of land
costs and costs associated with unpredictability and delay, and public
officials would equate losses with tax revenues and jobs. " 218
Sections lOl(b) and 102(c) of NEPA lay the groundwork for NEPA's
intent. NEPA fails to confront issues of sustainability directly, even though
it lays out essential policy concems. 219 What can be construed as a

temperatmes also include heat exposme dming outdoor ceremonies that involve
days of fasting without food or water. Additional community concerns about the
effects of climate change include increasing flood frequency and fire severity, as
well as declining water quality.

Id.
215. Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 (holding that NEPA did not create a
private right of action for the tribe to contest construction of an oil pipeline); Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB), 2016 WL 4734356, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2016)
(detailing the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe's suit against the Army Corps of Engineers for alleged
violations of NEPA and NHPA); Protect Om Cmtys. Found. v. Chu, No. 12CV3062, 2014 WL
1289444, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2014) (finding that the DOE ignored an EIS when it approved the
permit, thus violating the APA).
216. Id. See also Grazing Dist. v. Secretary of U.S. Dept. of Agric., 266 F.3d 889, 889 (8th Cir.
2001) (holding that an agency's failme to consider factors under NEPA does not automatically satisfy
standing requirements); White Earth Nation v. Kerry, No.14-CV-4726, 2015 WL 8483278, at *6 (D.
Minn. Dec. 9, 2015) (explaining that the NEPA claim must fail because it is not final agency action).
217. N.B. Dennis, What is an "Ecological Train Wrecks?" The Meaning of the Metaphor, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND NEPA: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 141, 141 (Ray Clark & Larry
Canter eds., 1997).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 156.
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weakness in NEPA for environmental issues, particularly tribal concerns,
can also be viewed as a strength. NEPA is effective because of its nuances.
The three different interpretations of NEPA understand it from the
perspective of a moral force and market regulator, as well as a way to
mitigate the tensions inherent between economic development and
environmental protection. 220 This next subsection will analyze the cases of
Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. U.S. Department of State (SissetonWahpeton),221 White Earth Nation et al. v. U.S. Department of State (White
Earth), 222 and the Dakota Access Pipeline. 223
1. Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate and Strengthening the Tribal Trust Claim
In Sisseton-Wahpeton, the U.S. District Court of South Dakota
dismissed the tribal claims of NEPA, NHP A, APA, and treaty/trust
provisions. The court stated:
Even if the most egregious violations of the NHP A and NEPA
have occurred, which they have not, plaintiffs are asking the
court to direct the Department to "suspend and/or revoke the
Presidential Permit." However, if the court were to do so, the
President would still be free to issue the permit again under his
inherent Constitutional authority to conduct foreign policy on
behalf of the nation. 224

The court emphasized the congressional intent of NEPA, 225 which
required "the federal government 'use all practical means, consistent with
other essential considerations of national policy [to] preserve important
historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and maintain,
wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of
220. Mark Sagoff, NEPA: Ethics, Economics, and Science in Environmental Law, in LAW OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 821, 822, 841-43, 851-52 (Scott E. Schang et al. eds., 2016).
221. Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. U.S. Dep't of State, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D.S.D. 2009).
222. White Earth Nation v. Kerry, No. 14-4726-(MJD/LIB), 2015 WL 8483278, at *1 (D. Minn.
Dec. 9, 2015).
223. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 5 (describing the Dakota Access project); Samantha L.
Varsalona, Pipelines, Protests and General Permits, GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. (Oct. 28, 2016),
https://gelr.org/2016/10/28/pipelines-protests-and-general-permits/ (examining Nationwide Permit 12,
the underlying permit at issue in the Dakota Access controversy).
224. Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1078 (referring to the National Historic
Preservation Act of 1966 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969).
225. Id. at 1079 (stating that "Congress' purpose ... was, inter alia, to create and maintain
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social,
economic, and other requirements of present and futme generations of Americans.") (internal quotation
omitted).
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individual choice. " 226 The court, relying on Central South Dakota Co-op.
Grazing District v. Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, decided that
NEPA did not give rise to a private right of action on its own. 227 The court
suggested that a NEPA challenge would have to be tied to an AP A claim. 228
The court then turned toward congressional intent in the enactment of
NHP A, finding that, "the spirit and direction of the Nati on are founded
upon and reflected in its historic heritage. " 229
Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate cited the sole-organ doctrine in deciphering
that no proper challenge lies through the AP A and NEPA, since the permit
was not an agency action. 230 But in Sierra Club v. Clinton, the court
rendered its opinion without any discussion of foreign relations law that
NEPA applies via the APA to the State Department's permitting decisionparticularly given that the Department had, in fact, prepared an
environmental impact statement. 231 Jean Galbraith and David Zaring
considered these opinions in discussing soft law as foreign relations law,
and noted the strains between NEPA and executive power. 232 "In analyzing
these various opinions, a report prepared by the Congressional Research
Service suggested that the executive branch could choose whether or not to
make itself subject to NEPA based on whether or not it chose to conduct a
NEPA review, at least for cross-border projects. " 233 Because tribal lands are
considered foreign and subject to different requirements from run-of-themill projects located on non-tribal U.S. lands, projects on tribal lands are
similar to cross-border projects. These projects, specifically pipeline
projects, should be subject to the same environmental scrutiny of crossborder projects, but without the imposition of the executive power to
determine whether or not NEPA applies. As arms of the executive branch,
the EPA and BIA should more carefully consider the adverse climate
change impacts of pipeline permitting on tribal lands, as well as the
encroachment of pipeline projects on tribal property rights.

226. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2012)).
227. Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1079. See also Cent. S.D. Coop. Grazing
Dist. v. Secretary of U.S. Dept. of Agric., 266 F.3d 889, 894 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that NEPA does
not provide for a private right of action, but the APA does).
228. Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
229. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(l) (2012)).
230. Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1082. See also Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S.
Dep't of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d 105, 112-13 (D.D.C. 2009) (reaching a similar conclusion).
231. SierraClubv. Clinton, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1157 (D. Minn. 2010).
232. Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
735, 770 (2014).
233. Id. at 770 n.173.
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In Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate, the proposed pipeline would be situated
near land reestablished to the public domain. 234 The court noted that in
ceding land back to the United States, the Tribe relinquished land use rights
and could no longer regulate the land use by non-Indians. 235 The court
reasoned that the plaintiffs had to "identify a substantive source of law that
establishes specific fiduciary or other duties, and allege that the
Government has failed faithfully to perform those duties. " 236 The court
indicated that the plaintiffs did not establish a valid trust claim, 237 but the
court emphasized that the decision still did not offer "the defendants a free
pass to 'do-as-they-please. "'238
2. White Earth Nation v. Kerry

White Earth Nation is a federally recognized Indian tribe in
Northwestern Minnesota, established through the 1867 Treaty between the
U.S. government and the Mississippi Band of Ojibwe. 239 Tribal members
have historically had rights to hunt, fish, gather, etc. 240 In White Earth
Nation v. Kerry, the tribe and other groups and organizations (including
Honor the Earth, Indigenous Environmental Network, Minnesota
Conservation Foundation, MN350, Center for Biological Diversity, Sierra
234. Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 (citing Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip,
430 U.S. 584, 587-88 (1977)). See also Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation v.
United States, 21 CL Ct. 176, 179 (1990) (noting that the tribe ceded lands to the public); Oglala Sioux
Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 537 F. Supp. 2d 161, 171 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that Congress
authorized diminution of tribal lands); DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Court for the Tenth Judicial District, 420
U.S. 425, 427-28 (1975) (finding jurisdiction over members of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe on lands
that had reverted to the public domain).
235. Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 (quoting South Dakota v. Bomland,
508 U.S. 679, 688 (1993)).
236. Id. (quoting United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 506 (2003)).
237. Id. (dismissing Sisseton under FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6)).
238. Id. The court indicated that,
[t]hey will, of comse, still be subjected to the rigorous federal environmental and
historical preservation laws throughout the construction and operation phases of
the proposed pipeline. In this case, however, the court lacks the authority to strike
down the issuance of the permit. Alternatively, ifthe court did have such power, I
find that a good faith effort was made to identify historic properties that may be
affected by this project. Even with the granting of the permit, North Dakota and
South Dakota have and are exercising considerable state regulation of the
construction and operation of the pipeline.
Id.
239. White
Earth
Natural
Resources
Department,
WHITE
EARTH
NATION,
http://www.whiteearth.com/programs@program_id=8.html (last visited May 8, 2017).
240. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4, White Earth Nation v. Kerry, 2015
WL 8483278 (D. Minn. Nov. 11, 2014) (No. 0:14-cv-4726-MJD-LI), 2014 WL 5844158.
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Club, and National Wildlife Federation) argued that the State Department's
authorization of the Enbridge Pipeline and the Bypass Project in the
absence of a NEPA review violated NEPA's fundamental requirement to
"look before you leap. " 241 The plaintiffs contended that the State
Department violated NEPA by allowing and authorizing Enbridge to
proceed with its Line 67 Expansion Project prior to the completion of the
ongoing NEPA review. 242
The tribe and groups brought the action on behalf of their members
who live, work, and recreate in areas that will be affected by
climate, air and/or water pollution from the New Pipeline, its
facilities, and refineries processing oil transported by the New
Pipeline, and by the deleterious impacts of increased emissions of
greenhouse gases resulting from the refining and end-use of tar
sands crude [and the concern for] increased risk of harm to their
health, recreational, economic, and aesthetic interests as a result
of the State Department's decision to allow a project with
significant environmental impacts to proceed without fully
analyzing and considering those impacts. 243

The complaint put forth that "[t]he State Department's failure to
provide required information and analyze and/or mitigate reasonably
foreseeable direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts" of the project deprived
the tribes of "their right to participate fully in the process leading to the
issuance of the Presidential Permit. " 244 The lawsuit alleged that
"[p ]laintiffs' members use and enjoy areas that may be adversely affected
by the New Pipeline for fishing, hunting, camping, photography, and for
engaging in other environmental, vocational, scientific, educational,
religious, cultural, aesthetic, and recreational activities. " 245 The proposed
route for the New Pipeline would crisscross land near the 1855 Treaty
Territory, where the tribes have rights to hunt, fish, gather, and engage in
spiritual and cultural practices. 246 These lands also include spiritually and
culturally significant native plant and animal species, along with historic
sites. 247 Plaintiffs note in their complaint,

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
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[b ]oth Enbridge and the State Department consider[ ed] this
throughput increase a change in the operation of Line 67 at the
U.S.-Canada border that requires an amended Presidential
Permit. The State Department has acknowledged that the
environmental impacts from the throughput increase are
significant and were not considered in its earlier Final
Environmental Impact Statement for Line 67 ("FEIS").
Therefore, the State Department has determined that in order to
comply with NEPA it must first complete a Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement ("SEIS") before authorizing the
Line 67 Expansion Project. 248

The U.S. Department of State, FERC, and DOE use their own
interpretations when making decisions about directives in executive
orders. 249 Executive orders require the agency to "[g]ather necessary
project-specific information from the applicant; [s]eek input from specific
outside federal agencies; and [d]ecide whether to seek input from additional
local, state, tribal, or federal agencies or from members of the public. " 250 A
Presidential Permit is issued if "the agency determines that the project
would 'serve the national interest' (pursuant to E.O. 13337) or be
'consistent with the public interest' (pursuant to E.O. 10485)."251
The lawsuit alleged that members of the represented groups
face increased risk of harm to their health, recreational,
economic, and aesthetic interests as a result of the State
Department's decision to allow a project with significant
environmental impacts to proceed without fully analyzing and
considering those impacts. 252

The case against Enbridge turned on whether judicial review was
available in the State Department's actions. 253 The Minnesota District Court
found that "the State Department's actions in this case are Presidential in

248. Id. at 15.
249. LINDA LUTHER & PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONGRESS. RES. SERV., PRESIDENTIAL PERMIT
REVIEW FOR CROSS-BORDER PIPELINES AND ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION 2 (2015), https://www.fas.org/
sgp/ crs/misc/R44140. pdf.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 6, White Earth Nation v. Kerry, 2015
WL 8483278 (No. 14-4726 (MJD/LIB)).
253. White Earth Nation v. Kerry, No. 14-4726 (MJD/LIB), 2015 WL 8483278, at *7 (D. Minn.
Dec. 9, 2015).
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nature, and thus not subject to judicial review." 254 The court rejected
plaintiffs' arguments regarding the EIS process for a federal action. 255 The
court observed the distinction that the cases in Sisseton-Wahpeton and
Natural Resources Defense Council consider "the State Department's
interpretation of a Presidential Permit rather than a determination on an
initial application for a Presidential Permit," but the court found that "both
types of determinations are Presidential in nature and should not be subject
to judicial review." 256
3. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. Army Corps of Engineers
The case involving the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) has raised
legal issues and political concerns for environmental and indigenous rights.
The issue involves Dakota Access, LLC, which is a subsidiary of Energy
Transfer Crude Oil Company, LLC, and the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe of
North and South Dakota, a federally recognized Indian tribe. 257 The
Standing Rock Indian Reservation is located "half a mile upstream from
where DAPL's crude oil pipeline would cross the Missouri River
underneath Lake Oahe in North Dakota."258 The 1,172-mile-long proposed
pipeline is expected to transport 470,000 barrels of oil per day across four
states. 259
254. Id.
255. The court states,
[p]laintiffs cite to a decision from this District in which the court, in a footnote,
disagreed with the decisions in Sisseton-Wahpeton and Natural Res. Def Council
"insofar as they hold that any action taken by the State Department pmsuant to an
executive order, and in particular the preparation of an EIS for a major federal
action, is not subject to judicial review."
Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Clinton, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1157 n.3 (D. Minn. 2010)). See also Protect
Om Cmtys. Found. v. Chu, No. 12CV3062, 2014 WL 1289444, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2014)
(denying the DOE's motion to dismiss in a suit alleging that the agency ignored the results of an EIS,
which the DOE based on the argument that its action was presidential, and thus immune to judicial
review).
256. White Earth Nation, 2015 WL 8483278, at *7.
257. Varsalona, supra note 223. See also Who is Dakota Access, LLC?, DAKOTA ACCESS
PIPELINE FACTS, https://daplpipelinefacts.com/dt_articles/dakota-access-llc/ (last visited May 8, 2017)
(describing the partners in Dakota Access, LLC); Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive
Services from the United States Bmeau of Indian Affairs, 80 Fed. Reg. 1942, 1942-43, 1946 (Jan. 14,
2015) (listing the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe of North and South Dakota as a federally recognized
tribe).
258. Varsalona, supra note 223. See also Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
No. 16-1534 (JEB), 2016 WL 4734356, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2016) (discussing tribal uses of the
Missomi River banks).
259. Caroline Kenny et al., Dakota Access Pipeline to Be Rerouted, CNN (Dec. 5, 2016, 1:08
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/04/politics/dakota-access-pipeline/. The Dakota Access Pipeline
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When the court denied the Standing Rock Sioux's request for a
temporary injunction in September 2016, federal authorities said that they
"would not allow work on the Dakota Access Pipeline to proceed on
federal land near or under Lake Oahe pending more reviews of previous
environmental decisions, and said the case highlights a need for more
discussion on infrastructure projects near tribal lands, and possibly
reform." 260 A joint statement from the U.S. Department of Justice,
Department of Army, and Department of the Interior stated that, "[t]he
Army will not authorize constructing the Dakota Access pipeline on Corps
land bordering or under Lake Oahe until it can determine whether it will
need to reconsider any of its previous decisions regarding the Lake Oahe
site under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) or other federal
laws." 261 The federal government requested the pipeline to "voluntarily
pause all construction activity within 20 miles east or west of Lake
Oahe."262 The federal government also sought government-to-government
consultations to consider more meaningful tribal input in infrastructure
reviews, decisions for issues involving tribal lands, resources, and treaty
rights within existing frameworks, and the possibility of new legislation. 263
In 2016, the U.S. Army Corps said it would "not approve an easement
that would have allowed the proposed Dakota Access Pipeline to cross
under Lake Oahe in North Dakota."264 Even though the current pro-energy
federal regime will allow the project to move forward, grassroots activists
continue to target financial institutions in another avenue to thwart the

would connect the Bakken and Tirree Forks oil production areas in North Dakota to an existing crude oil
terminal near Pakota, Illinois. The pipeline is 30 inches in diameter and is projected to transport
approximately 470,000 barrels of oil per day, with a capacity as high as 570,000 barrels. U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE PROJECT: ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT GRASSLAND
AND WETLAND EASEMENT CROSSING 5 (May 2016), https://www.fWs.gov/uploadedFiles/DAPL%20
EA.pdf.
260. Daniel A. Medina, Federal Judge Denies Tribe's Request to Halt Dakota Access Pipeline,
NBC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2016, 10:36 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/federal-judge-deniestribe-s-request-halt-dakota-access-pipeline-n645616.
261. Press Release, Dep't of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Joint Statement from the Dep't of
Justice, the Dep't of the Army and the Dep't of the Interior Regarding Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v.
U.S. Army Corps ofEng'rs (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/joint-statement-departmentjustice-department-army-and-department-interior-regarding-standing.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Michael Edison Hayden & Catherin Thorbecke, Army Corps Will Not Grant Easement for
Dakota Access Pipeline Crossing, ABC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2016, 10:56 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/
army-grant-easement-dakota-access-pipeline-crossing/story?id=43969890.
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pipeline, with some banks already withdrawing financial support. 265 Over
the years, the legislative rules, administrative decisions, and judicial
precedent have eroded the rights of tribes in environmental matters. 266
Therefore, divestment options appear to be a more viable means to stop
projects where legal protections have failed.
What is ironic is that there are greater legal protections for tribal
mineral rights than tribal water and environmental protection rights. When
the interests of the tribes align with the broader corporate interests of the oil
and gas industry, the tribes benefit from property rights protection. When
tribal interests are against the oil and gas interests, the same is not true. In
other words, the interests and concerns of the oil and gas industry are
paramount to tribal rights on tribal lands. For example, non-Indian owners
of surface lands located within an area of the Osage Indian mineral estate
brought a case to enjoin a gas purchaser under contract with an Osage tribal
lessee from entering unleased lands and constructing pipelines between
well sites and high-pressure lines. The court stated: "Implicit in the federal
regulations is an imposition of the right of ingress and egress upon the
unleased surface lands as a necessary incident to the Osage Tribe's exercise

265. Perry Wheeler, Largest Bank in Norway Sells Its Assets in Dakota Access
Pipeline, GREENPEACE, http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/news/largest-bank-norway-sells-assets-dakotaaccess-pipeline/ (last visited May 8, 2017).
266. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 146-47 (1810) (describing the state of Indian rights to
land in terms of U.S. property law relative to the state of Georgia, and concluding that there was a
"uniform practice of acknowledging [Natives'] right of soil" as sovereigns, and any interest by a state or
the federal government was limited to the right to exclude competitors from pmchasing or conquering
it); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 52, 56-57 (1894) (summarizing that the grantee tribe retained neither
right of exclusive access nor wharfage rights to the river. The state had absolute ownership of rights in
front of high land given to grantee, which meant that the state had power to dispose of soil in the river,
and wharfage rights in front of the high land.); Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89
(1918) (holding that courts must construe statutes passed for the benefit of Native American tribes
liberally and in favor of the tribes); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 653 (1970) (finding
that the tribe did not have rights over a river bed); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 58-59
(1926) (holding that the use of navigable waters was not intended as an exclusive right to Native
Americans when those waters were located on reservation land, and that the land below navigable
waters is allocated for the benefit of the state); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 167
(1977) (summarizing that a court in Washington held that it hadjmisdiction to regulate tribal activities
on and off the reservation. The Washington court proceeded to limit the number offish that members of
the tribe may catch from the river.); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1981) (stating that
non-Indians may hunt and fish on land within the reservation, but not on land owned in fee by nonIndians without tribal regulation, unless non-Indian conduct threatens "political integrity, the economic
secmity, or the health or welfare of the tribe"); Lyon v. AMOCO Prod. Co., 923 P.2d 350, 352 (Colo.
App. 1996) (dismissing the allegations of air, water, and soil contamination on tribal lands against the
defendant oil companies); Arrow Midstream Holdings, L.L.C. v. 3 Bears Constr., L.L.C., 2015 ND 302,
iJ 1, 873 N.W.2d 16, 18 (N.D. 2015)(holding that the pipeline construction lien was invalid).
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of its ownership in the mineral estate," and that these regulations did not
constitute an unconstitutional taking of property. 267
Ill. CAPACITY BUILDING

A. Tribal Treaty Provisions

Defining and reclaiming tribal sovereignty is at issue here. Tribal
sovereignty is the authority of indigenous groups to govern themselves. 268
This notion of tribal sovereignty protects the core values and governance
systems of the native groups. Sarah Krakoff observes: "The possibility of
an extra-colonial existence was extinguished the moment Europeans
washed up-lost but ambitious-on the shores of North America." 269 She
argues that, "courts must find ways to interpret their sovereignty as
consistent with their current status. "270 What the Supreme Court has done is
"institutionalize[] tribal sovereignty within the matrix of American
democratic structure through language that alternately affirms tribal
political existence into perpetuity and consigns such political existence to
the whims of a superior power."271 "The conceptual construction and
subjugation of Indian tribalism by Western legal and societal institutions
reflect not merely the exertion of unequal power, but more generally a
preexisting, persistent, and critical disjunction between these two cultural
traditions. " 272
The tribal trust responsibility is "a legally enforceable fiduciary
obligation on the part of the United States to protect tribal treaty rights,
lands, assets, and resources, as well as a duty to carry out the mandates of
federal law with respect to American Indian and Alaska Native tribes and
villages. " 273 As early as 1790, Congress imposed limitations on tribal land

267. Bell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 641 P.2d l ll5, 1120 (Okla. 1982).
268. Tribal Sovereignty, CIVIL RlGHTS.ORG, http://www.civilrights.org/indigenous/tribalsovereignty/ (last visited May 8, 2017).
269. Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal
Sovereignty, 50AM. U. L. Rev. 1177, 1265 (2001).
270. Id. at 1266.
271. N. Bruce Duthu, Incorporative Discourse in Federal Indian Law: Negotiating Tribal
Sovereignty Through the Lens ofNative American Literature, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 141, 150 (2000).
272. Scott C. Idleman, Multiculturalism and the Future of Tribal Sovereignty, 35 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 589, 636 (2004).
273. Frequently Asked Questions: Why Tribes Exist Today in the United States, BUREAU OF
INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/ (last updated May 8, 2017).
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sales without federal approval. 274 The Supreme Court has recognized "the
undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between the United
States and Indian people"275 where the federal government "has charged
itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. " 276 The
federal trust responsibility to Indian tribes applies to all federal agencies,
and most agencies have developed policies and procedures to implement
this responsibility. 277 Inherent in this relationship is an enforceable
fiduciary responsibility on the part of the federal government to Indian
tribes to protect their lands and resources, unless altered by mutual
agreement. 278
Consultation is a key component in implementing the government's
trust responsibility and recognition of tribal sovereignty. Consultation is
also a critical component of each of the laws: NEPA, NHPA, Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA),
Archaeological Resources Protection Act (ARP A), American Indian
Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), and Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA). 279 As President Obama noted at his first tribal meeting,
"[M]eaningful dialogue between Federal officials and tribal officials has
greatly improved Federal policy toward Indian tribes. Consultation is a
critical ingredient of a sound and productive Federal-tribal relationship." 280
In 2000, President George W. Bush issued an Executive Order directing
federal agencies to improve their consultation and coordination with tribal

274. See Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 137, 137 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177
(2012)) (prohibiting persons from carrying on trade or intercomse with the Indian tribes without
license).
275. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983).
276. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1941) (holding that a mere
request for information is insufficient to constitute "reasonable effort" when the federal government
knew tribal customs would likely restrict disclosme of information).
277. See Nance v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 645 F.2d 701, 711 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that "any
Federal government action is subject to the United States' fiduciary responsibilities toward the Indian
tribes," including the EPA).
278. See Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 301, 306-07 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (discussing the U.S.
government's federal trust responsibility for the Individual Indian Money trust). The Cabe/ litigation is a
well-known example of the federal trust responsibility that over the comse of 14 years, resulted in two
Secretaries of the Department of the Interior being held in contempt, and legislation, signed into law by
President Obama, awarding $3.4 billion in damages. See Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-291, 124 Stat. 3064, 3066-70 (authorizing a settlement amount of over $2 billion for the Cobell
litigation, including attorney's fees).
279. See, e.g., Riley, supra note 95, at 50 (discussing that the purpose of NAGPRA is to
repatriate tribal remains and funerary objects to the tribes and set forth tribal consultations); Cecily
Harms, NAGPRA in Colorado: A Success Story, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 593, 602 (2012) (outlining the
procedmes ofNAGPRA).
280. Tribal Consultation, 74 Fed. Reg. 57881 (Nov. 9, 2009).
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govemments. 281 In November 2009, President Obama identified a failure of
the federal government to implement the 2000 Executive Order, and
directed all federal agencies to promptly develop consultation
implementation plans. 282 Consultation encompasses the notification of the
proposed project and mechanism to seek input. 283 Meaningful consultation
is "a two-way exchange of information, a willingness to listen, and an
attempt to understand and genuinely consider each other's opinions, beliefs,
and desired outcomes. " 284 Many tribes grapple with ways to enhance
economic development with employment and entrepreneurship
opportunities, while managing natural resources and tribal traditions. 285
Dean Suagee proposes the enactment and implementation of a kind of law
generically known as a Tribal Environmental Policy Act (TEPA). 286 A
TEPA is a tribal law-adapted NEPA, a tribal counterpart to the kind of state
laws often called "little NEP As. " 287 Tribal leaders have the option to enact a
TEP A as part of a management strategy to increase transparency and
"empower the people living or doing business within their reservation to

281. Exec. Order No. 13175, 66 Fed. Reg. 67249 (Nov. 6, 2000).
282. Tribal Consultation, 74 Fed. Reg. 57881 (Nov. 9, 2009). See also BUREAU OF LAND
MGMT., MANUAL HANDBOOK, 8120-TRIBAL CONSULTATION UNDER CULTURAL RESOURCES (Dec. 3,
2004) (showing that agency-adopted consultation policies are generally available on agency websites).
283. REBECCA W. WATSON, MANAGING CULTURAL RESOURCE ISSUES ON INDIAN LANDS 4
(2011 ), https ://www.wsmtlaw.com/assets/downloads/pdflmanaging-cultmal-resomce-issues-on-indianlands-RWW.pdf.
284. NAT'L Ass'N OF TRIBAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICERS, TRIBAL CONSULTATION:
BEST PRACTICES IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION 1 (2005), http://www.nathpo.org/PDF/Tribal_
Consultation.pdf. Project proponents should tread carefully in initiating consultation with an affected
tribe. It is important, first, to consult with the federal agency that is preparing the NEPA document or
has the statutory duty to consult. A project proponent should recognize that consultation may be
required with multiple tribes-those directly impacted by the proposed development, and other affected
tribes that may have a cultmal, spiritual, or historic relation to the project area. Id. at 14. Developers
should appreciate that tribes may regard a cold contact by a private party as inappropriate in the context
of the federal agency's responsibility to the tribe in the government-to-government relationship. Id. at
12, 24-27. Finally, there are specific consultation requirements in each of the federal statutes discussed.
Id. at 6-8. Failme to consult adequately can result in litigation and project delay. Pueblo of Sandia v.
United States, 50 F.3d 856, 860 (10th Cir. 1995). See also Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and
Mandamus Relief at 4, La Cuna de Aztlan Sacred Sites Prot. Advisory Comm. v. U.S. Dept. of the
Interior, No. 10-CV-2664 (WQH) (S.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2010) (suing the DOI for failme to consult under
the NHPA before approving multiple energy projects).
285. Dean B. Suagee, Tribal Environmental Policy Acts and the Landscape of Environmental
Law, 23 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 12, 12 (2009).
286. Id.
287. Id. "Fifteen states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have enacted little
NEPAs." Id. See also DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION§ 12:1 (perm. ed.
rev. vol. 2016) (discussing state laws modeled on NEPA).
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become involved in the decision-making processes of tribal government
agencies. " 288
NEPA has provided a major shift in federal agency policy to include
the public in decision-making processes. 289 "One reason tribal leaders might
want to enact a law to emulate this aspect of the federal experience with
NEPA is that it could help to deflect the hostility that the Supreme Court
has shown in recent decades to the exercise of tribal sovereignty. " 290 As
Philip Frickey notes, Supreme Court decisions inconsistent with the
foundation principles of federal Indian law seem to be motivated by a
'judicial aversion to basic claims of tribal authority over nonmembers," and
the Court seems to assume that Congress shares this aversion. 291
NEPA led the push for the enactment of State Environmental Policy
Acts (SEP As) in various states, which require the state to prepare an impact
statement for government actions that have an impact on the
environment. 292 "SEPAs differ in the procedural and substantive
determinations they require, the definition of an 'action,' whether local
governmental agencies are covered, what the standards are for determining
threshold significance, when an EIS is sufficient, and what the standards are
for judicial review. " 293
Hydrocarbon transport infrastructure projects on tribal lands encounter
various hurdles. Like federal lands, Indian lands have additional layers of
federal laws and bureaucracy that disincentivize energy projects to some
private developers. 294 These obstacles are similar to the challenges for the
creation of alternative energy development on Indian lands. Elizabeth
Kronk Warner points out that the lack of necessary infrastructure, the
288. Suagee, supra note 285, at 13.
289. Id.
290. Id. See also COHEN'S, supra note 47, § 4.02(3)(a) (explaining that the Supreme Court
created the theory of "implicit divestiture of [tribal] sovereignty" in order to deny tribes jmisdiction over
criminal, civil, and adjudicative claims on their land).
291. Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of
Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1999).
292. Kathryn C. Plunkett, The Role of Local Environmental Impact Review, in NEW GROUND:
THE ADVENT OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 299, 301 (John Nolan ed., 2003). See also CAL. PuB.
RES. CODE §§ 21000--21177 (West 2016) (establishing California's statewide requirement and methods
for environmental impact statements that were enacted in 1970); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.010
(2009) (describing the purpose of Washington's State Environmental Policy Act); N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV. LAW§ 8-0101to8-0117 (McKinney 2017).
293. Plunkett, supra note 292, at 301. See also David Sive & Mark A Chertok, "Little NEPAs"
and Their Environmental Impact Processes, 2005 ALI-ABA ENVTL. LiTIG. 2-15 (comparing SEPAs
using the six-factor framework); Stewart E. Sterk, Environmental Review in the Land Use Processes:
New York's Experience with SEQRA, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 2041, 2041, 2042 (1992) (discussing factors
that are considered when determining whether to conduct an EIS).
294. WATSON, supra note 283, at 1.
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burdensome lease and siting review process, and the lack of adequate
financial incentives on Indian lands prevent full-scale deployment of
alternative energy. 295 Typical challenges for renewable energy, in fact,
become beneficial to the buildup of hydrocarbon infrastructure. The new
right-of-way regulations minimize hurdles for hydrocarbon transport
projects. 296 Yet, existing procedural remedies of NEPA and the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) prov1s10ns can still allow for the
administration of a more participatory process through capacity building for
the environmental protection of tribal lands. With the proper information
tools, tribes and their representatives can more readily access their
environmental, social, and cultural needs for the preservation of tribal
sovereignty and land rights. The intervention of Western property law
regimes "privileges the already powerful and violates the sovereignty of
indigenous peoples."297 "[U]tter transparency regarding available capacity
and the price of trades, a frictionless web-based exchange, an effective
commodities clause, and incremental pricing of new capacity" are elements
of the U.S. market for legal transport entitlement that are not available in
Canada. 298
By and large, the Bill of Rights provides negative protection for
individuals from government action. 299 The issues emerge whether the
government should place affirmative duties on individuals to safeguard the
natural environment, and whether the government has the same affirmative
duties. 300
B. International Regimes

While the domestic sovereignty system may inadequately address
concerns of indigenous communities because membership and reservations
regulate the bounds of tribal jurisdiction, international law offers alternate
295. Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Alternative Energy Development in Indian Country: Lighting the
Way for the Seventh Generation, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 449, 467-68 (2010). See also Tracey A. LeBeau,
The Green Road Ahead: Renewable Energy Takes a Stumble But is on the Right Path, Possibly Right
Through Indian Country, FED. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 2009, 38, 41 (highlighting the "dire need" for
upgrading the "United States' old 'decrepit' electric infrastructure" to increase production of renewable
energy, and the need to streamline the U.S. permitting process and develop a process for recovering the
cost of investment).
296. Rights-of-Way on Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,492, 72,492 (Nov. 19, 2015) (to be
codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 169) (summarizing streamlined changes in regulation).
297. WHITT, supra note 179, at 5-6.
298. MAKHOLM, supra note 14, at 157.
299. THOMAS MORE HOBAN & RICHARD OLIVER BROOKS, GREEN JUSTICE: THE
ENVIRONMENT AND THE COURTS 59 (2d ed. 1996).
300. Id.
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legal tools to discuss climate change. 301 The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) entered into force in 1994; and
by 2004, 189 countries, including the United States, ratified the
Convention. 302 The 2015 Paris Climate Treaty is laying groundwork for
greater climate change mitigation measures. 303 Attempts at climate change
adaption, such as the updated CEQ Guidelines, do not sustain a level of
commitment necessary to actually limit climate change substantially.
In the absence of true climate leadership, various international lawsspecifically relating to international human rights and indigenous and tribal
rights-may provide remedies for the efforts to limit hydrocarbon transport
projects on tribal lands. Individuals are able to seek redress through an
individual treaty body under three specific treaties: "[T]he Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD), and the Convention against Torture (CAT)." 304
The ICCPR can provide a means to submit an individual complaint. The
admissibility requirements are: (1) the communication must be with respect
to a State party to the Optional Protocol; (2) the complaint must be written
by the victim of the alleged violation; and (3) the complaint must be in
writing. 305 The complaints committee first addresses the admissibility of the
complaint and then considers the merits of the case. 306 "A particularly
critical issue of admissibility is the requirement of exhaustion of domestic
remedies, unless they are unduly prolonged."307 "The requirement that
domestic remedies must be exhausted ensures that international procedures

301. Rebecca Tsosie, Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples: Comparative Models of
Sovereignty, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: THE SEARCH FOR LEGAL REMEDIES 79,
79-80 (Randall S. Abate & Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner eds., 2013).
302. UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, THE FIRST TEN
YEARS 14 (2004), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/first_ten_years_en.pd£
303. Id.
304. Hilary Charlesworth, Individual Complaints: An Overview and Admissibility Requirements,
in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 74, 74 (Sarah Pritchard ed.,
1998). The United States has ratified all three treaties. The ICCPR, which was ratified in 1992, provides
a unique opportunity for tribes to challenge hydrocarbon transport projects that endanger their life,
violate human rights, and impinge upon the right to self-determination. The ICCPR is the "supreme law
of the land" under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. FAQ: The Covenant on Civil &
Political Rights (ICCPR), AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/faq-covenant-civilpolitical-rights-iccpr (last visited May 8, 2017).
305. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1-3, Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302.
306. Charlesworth, supra note 304, at 74.
307. Id. at 77.
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are used as a last resort, and prevents international committees from being
oveiwhelmed with complaints. " 308
The most critical right for indigenous peoples under the ICCPR is the
Article 1 right to self-determination. 309 Groups, not individuals, must claim
this right. 310 Hilary Charlesworth says that indigenous groups must "think
creatively about other provisions in the ICCPR," which may apply. 311 Other
useful provisions, she notes, are the non-discrimination on the basis of race
(Article 26) and the right to preservation of one's culture (Article 27). 312
The purpose of discussing international mechanisms for damages aside
from traditional domestic remedies serves to provide a means for redress.
Having a sense of heightened rights and remedies available can work to
intensify efforts to preserve environmental rights and tribal sovereignty. 313
A variety of judicial remedies on the domestic and global front will work to
raise greater awareness of the role of law in protecting tribal land rights.
Meanwhile, ICERD is established to "protect individuals and groups
from discrimination based on race, whether the discrimination is
intentional, or is the result of seemingly neutral policies. " 314 In 1994, the
United States ratified ICERD and is, therefore, bound by all provisions of
the treaty, including compliance review by the United Nations Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 315 "ICERD does not explicitly
address environmental concerns, environmental issues are frequently raised
in reports to CERD, as well as in the types of supplemental information
CERD requests from States Parties."316 The ICERD Committee has
308. Id.
309. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 304.
310. Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (Mar.
26, 1990) (complaint submitted to the U.N. Human Rights Committee).
311. Charlesworth, supra note 304, at 79-80.
312. Id.
313. See Gregory P. Crinion & Tracey Smith Lindeen, Environmental Law & Indian Lands,
WIS. LAW., Sept. 1996, at 14, 17, 60 (describing the regulatory jmisdiction gap created in tribal territory
regarding environmental protection regulation enforcement); Kevin Grover, Environmental Regulation
in Indian Country, 52 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 20.05 (2006) (discussing growth of tribal regulatory
programs under environmental statutes); Lilly Fang, Environmental Review Problems of Cross-Border
Projects Under NEPA: Lessons from the Tar Sands Pipelines, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 285, 286 (2012)
(stating that judicial review is an important component of environmental protection); Dean B. Suagee &
Christopher T. Steams, Indigenous Self-Government, Environmental Protection, and the Consent of the
Governed: A Tribal Environmental Review Process, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 59, 62-67
(1994) (discussing international laws that may aid in the development of indigenous rights).
314. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, US HUMAN RIGHTS
NETWORK, http://www.ushmetwork.org/om-work/issues/cerd (last visited May 8, 2017).
315. Id.
316. Kristen Marttila Gast, Environmental Justice and Indigenous Peoples in the United States:
An International Human Rights Analysis, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 272 (2004).
"[I]n 1995, CERD requested information from the Nigerian government on government efforts to
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recognized that discrimination against Indigenous Peoples is included under
the general prohibition of Article I, and that States Parties should safeguard
indigenous cultures. 317 ICERD has recommended that:
with respect to local Indigenous Peoples, State Parties should
provide conditions "allowing for a sustainable economic and
social development compatible with ... cultural characteristics,"
and that they should respect Indigenous Peoples' property rights
over their traditional lands by returning those lands to indigenous
control or, where this is not possible, providing "just, fair and
prompt compensation" for those lands. 318
CONCLUSION

The U.S. commitment to protect tribal environmental sovereignty
within its borders is crucial for its efforts and leadership toward
environmental sustainability and natural resource preservation. The farreaching implications of tribal environmental sovereignty collide with the
U.S. economic and expansionist ambitions. While American borders will
preserve the identities of ethnic groups that had been adversely affected by environmental
deterioration." Id. "CERD expressed concern about potential rights violations in Papua New Guinea
stemming from a large strip mining operation that adversely affected a local indigenous population and
their environment." Id. See also Caroline Dammen, Claiming Environmental Rights: Some Possibilities
Offered by the United Nations' Human Rights Mechanisms, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998)
(supporting the same sentiment as the quoted text).
317. Gast, supra note 316, at 272.
318. Id. at 272-73 (footnote omitted) (quoting Comm. on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Gen. Recommendation No. 23: Indigenous Peoples, iii! 4-5, U.N. Doc. A/52/18, annex
V (Aug. 18, 1997)). See also Douglas Luckerman, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Environmental
Primacy on Tribal Lands, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 635, 639 (2003) (explaining that although the State of
Maine is concerned with tribes setting environmental regulations for tribal lands that are too stringent
for businesses, tribal regulations are essential to maintaining a native way of life); Rebecca Tsosie,
Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role of Ethics, Economics, and
Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 320-22, 330 (1996) (arguing that the
incompatibility of Anglo-American values pervading federal environmental law and Indian tribal values
inhibits the tribes' environmental self-determination). Tsosie recommends several models, some of
which involve building on community institutions, incorporating native peoples into majority
institutions, or adapting the market economy to complement an indigenous economy. Id. Anna Fleder &
Darren J. Ranco, Tribal Environmental Sovereignty: Culturally Appropriate Protection of Paternalism,
19 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 35, 40 (2004) (describing that if an agency supports tribal
sovereignty, then that tribe will face fewer governmental challenges); Judith V. Royster, Oil and Water
in the Indian Country, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 457, 489-90 (1997) (concluding that tribes must ensme
environmental regulation of the oilfields); Allison M. Dussias, Protecting Pocahontas's World: The
Mattaponi Tribe's Struggle Against Virginia's King William Reservoir Project, 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
1, 120 (2012) (claiming that the "reserved water rights doctrine should provide the basis for reserved
water rights for the Mattaponi tribe").
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likely not expand geographically, within the United States the borders can
swell by encroaching upon Indian lands through the further exploitation and
development of hydrocarbon resource projects. While tribal parties may not
exactly be incongruent to these economic opportunities, the federal
government has a duty to protect the tribes from further encroachment.
Doing so is not only environmentally and ecologically sound, but justice
and fairness require such integrity in resource management.

